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THE ETHICS OF INTERGENERATIONAL
REPRESENTATION
TERESA STANTON COLLETT*
Because the family plays a central role in most estate-planning decisions com-
mentators and courts have sought to develop ways of defining a lawyer's ethical
obligations in representing elder clients who seek estate-planning advice. These
new views of legal ethics emphasize the fact that clients may not merely seek to
further their own individual interests but, rather, may seek advice from an attor-
ney about what is best for their family as a whole. In this Article, Professor Col-
lett analyzes the four types of representation that are available to elder clients who
seek estate planning advice. individual representation, representation as an inter-
mediary, joint representation, and family representation. She analyzes the bene-
fits and difficulties that accompany each of these options. Next, Professor Collett
critiques family representation, and she concludes that this form of representation
may be inappropriate because it eliminates the lawyer's accountability to individ-
ual family members who seek representation.
INTRODUCTIONE VERY lawyer engaged in estate planning or elder law recognizes
that family is a central element in the lives of most people. It has
been suggested that families, not individuals, are the fundamental build-
ing blocks of society.1 Caring for family members, both during and after
life, is a high priority of many clients.2 This is true whether the lawyer
represents a parent or an adult child or some combination of family
members. Yet the rules that govern lawyers' conduct are largely pre-
mised upon an understanding of clients as single, perhaps even isolated,
individuals.' Duties of loyalty4 and confidentiality5 run only to the "cli-
ent." In many jurisdictions only the "client" has standing to sue for inju-
* Professor, South Texas College of Law, Houston, Texas. This Article reflects the
benefit of participating in the Fordham Conference on Ethical Issues in Representing
Older Clients held December 3-5, 1993. The author is particularly grateful to the Na-
tional Academy of Elder Law Attorneys for their support of her participation. Profes-
sors Catherine Burnett, Matthew Mitten, and Jeffrey Pennell, as well as Raymond
Young, Esq. and Michael Gilfix, Esq. provided insightful editorial comments on early
drafts of this Article.
1. See Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 1135,
1169 ("What has changed is not the belief that the family is a building block of the larger
society, but the prevailing picture of the larger society itself."); Note, State Power and
Discrimination by Private Clubs: First Amendment Protection for Nonexpressive Associa-
tions, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1835, 1845 (1991) ("The family receives the protection of sub-
stantive due process because it is an irreducible building block of a free society.").
2. See Thomas L. Shaffer, The Planning and Drafting of Wills and Trusts 24 (1979)
("Property is used to keep the family together at least as much as the family is used to
keep the property together.").
3. See Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 Tex. L.
Rev. 963, 969-70 (1987).
4. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 1.7-1.9 (1992) (hereinafter
"Model Rules"].
5. See Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.6.
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ries resulting from an attorney's negligence.6  Legal and ethical
consideration of the interests of "non-clients" is limited largely to avoid-
ing deceitful or fraudulent practices.7 Yet estate planners and elder law
specialists regularly counsel individuals who expect the lawyer to con-
sider the interests of others-spouses, children, parents, or other family
members. This seeming incongruity between the individualism inherent
in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the practical experience
of most estate planning and elder law attorneys8 was the subject of con-
sideration by the Fordham Conference on Ethics and the Representation
of the Elderly working group on intergenerational representation. 9 This
Article is a result of the author's participation in that working group.10
Examined in this Article are the various types of intergenerational rep-
resentation that clients may obtain. Part I discusses how clients may
initiate representation. This part focuses on the issue of who identifies
the client and the consequences that flow from this identification. Part II
discusses the four types of representation that intergenerational clients
may choose from: individual representation, representation by an inter-
mediary, joint representation, and family representation. Part III criti-
ques family representation, which is the most recent form of multiple
representation. This Article concludes that family representation is an
inappropriate form of multiple representation because it reduces the law-
yer's accountability to individual family members seeking representation.
I. INITIATING REPRESENTATION
Intergenerational representation typically arises in one of two ways.
In estate planning, often it arises in the context of "long-term" represen-
6. See Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 7.1 (3d ed. 1989)
("Traditionally, attorneys' malpractice exposure has been limited to their clients."); Joan
Teshima, Attorney's Liability, to One Other Than Immediate Client, for Negligence in
Connection with Legal Duties, 61 A.L.R.4th 615, 634 (in general, attorney cannot be
liable to nonclient).
7. See Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 4.1; Mallen & Smith, supra note 6, § 6.1.
8. The seeming inapplicability of the Model Rules to elder law and estate planning
has been noted by a number of commentators. See, e.g., Patricia M. Batt, The Family
Unit as Client: A Means to Address the Ethical Dilemmas Confronting Elder Law Attor-
neys, 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 319, 320 (1992) (arguing that "the Model Rules should be
modified to address the elder lawyer's practice"); Ronald C. Link et. al., Developments
Regarding the Professional Responsibility of the Estate Planning Lawyer: The Effect of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 22 Real Prop., Prob. & Tr. J. 1, 32 (1987) (arguing
that Model Rules do not specifically address estate planning).
9. For purposes of this Article, intergenerational representation refers to related rep-
resentation of multiple family members who seek to attain a common goal either through
employing the services of the lawyer as intermediary under the terms of Model Rule 2.2
or as joint counsel in addressing a particular concern or goal.
10. The vigorous discussion of the working group has led to significant refinement of
the author's understanding of the issues in this area. Members of the Intergenerational
Conflicts Working Group were Mary Daly, Sia Arnason, Jerry Cohen, Ayn Crawley,
Wiley Dinsmore, Michael Gilfix, Hal Leiberman, and Raymond Young. Meg Reed and
Lori Stiegel, as staff support, also provided additional insight in their attempts to summa-
rize the group's discussions.
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tation. An attorney begins a relationship with an individual client which
ripens into long-term representation of the client's business and personal
interests. Over the course of many years, the client confides in the attor-
ney not only information concerning the structure and disposition of fi-
nancial assets, but also intimate details concerning his or her personal
life. Having obtained and retained the trust of the initial client, the law-
yer soon is sought out by other family members for advice and counsel
concerning their affairs, thus becoming "the family lawyer." In this
context, the representation evolves from representation of a single, long-
term client into the representation of multiple family members, some-
times for matters that concern only an isolated individual, and sometimes
for a common concern or enterprise involving several family members.
The following hypothetical fact pattern illustrates how such multiple rep-
resentation can arise, as well as the conflicts of interest that may develop
as the representation continues:
Hypothetical 1: Lawyer has represented Father since he began his
manufacturing business in the early 1960s. During the first fifteen
years, the business struggled, barely able to provide a reasonable living
to Father and his family. However, during the sixteenth year, Child,
having completed a bachelor's degree in engineering, joined the com-
pany and began to initiate substantial changes in its production and
marketing methods. Child sought the advice of Lawyer as the lawyer
for the company as well as personal advisor for Child's estate planning.
Due to the expansion of the business and increased financial risks from
potential liability, the company was incorporated with Father as ma-
jority shareholder. Lawyer continued to advise Father, Child, and the
corporation.
In spite of Father's majority ownership, Child's influence in the corpo-
ration increased and Father's influence in the corporation diminished.
While this shift in authority within the company was accompanied by
minor conflict between Father and Child, it never escalated to the
point where Lawyer was asked to intervene beyond providing judicious
advice about the corporation's best interests from a legal perspective.
Recently, Child contacted Lawyer and expressed substantial concerns
about Father's failing health and perceived diminished capacity to
make decisions. Father, at age 70, has become more irascible over the
years, and Child is concerned that Father will block corporate innova-
tions necessary to respond to the increasing globalization of the manu-
facturing industry. In addition to concerns related to the business,
Child is genuinely concerned about Father's decision-making capacity
concerning health care. It seems that Father has increasingly suffered
from occasional trembling and yet refuses to seek medical diagnosis
and treatment. After revealing all of this information to Lawyer,
Child asks Lawyer about the various legal mechanisms available to
shift decision-making authority from Father to Child.
Lawyer has not met with Father within the past two years and has no
11. See John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries: The Representation of Mul-
tiple Clients in the Modern Legal Profession, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. 741, 747.
1455
1456 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62
personal knowledge that would help in evaluating the legitimacy of
Child's concerns. Over the years, Lawyer has had only minimal con-
tact with Mother, and that contact has always related to the drafting of
her will as a part of the family's estate planning. To Lawyer's knowl-
edge, Mother has never been involved in the company or attempted to
exert any sort of control over the financial decisions of her husband
concerning their property. Child is an only child.
These facts represent a typical long-term client situation, presenting legal
issues that impact upon both the person and estate of Father and the
estates of Child and Mother. 12
The second circumstance that gives rise to representation of multiple
family members will be referred to throughout this Article as the "new
client situation." This situation is most common in elder law, in which
immediate assistance is sought in ordering an older person's estate or
providing for the care of his or her person. Often another family member
attends the initial meeting with the lawyer, and it is common for addi-
tional family members to be consulted prior to undertaking any action.
Hypothetical 2: Family consults Lawyer for assistance in determining
how to help Husband. An unrelated client recommended Lawyer to
Family. Husband and Wife are seventy and sixty-five years old, re-
spectively, and have been married for forty-five years. They have two
adult children, A and B. Husband, who is becoming increasingly dis-
oriented and frail, Wife, A, and B come to Lawyer seeking legal ad-
vice. Wife can no longer care for Husband and is considering placing
him in a long-term care facility. A and B, as heirs to their parents'
estate, have concurrent, potentially conflicting concerns about their
mother's financial and physical well-being and their father's increasing
need for long-term care. They also may have a conflicting interest in
maintaining their inheritance. Husband says that he does not want to
go to a long-term care facility but also says that he trusts his family
and Lawyer's judgment. 13
These facts illustrate the new client situation, encompassing legal issues
that affect both the person and estate of Husband and Wife, as well as the
expectant interests of A and B.
12. Clearly Child and Corporation are present clients; Father is probably a present
client, although arguably a former client; and Mother is more likely a former client,
although she too may be a present client. The classification of present or former client
controls the ethical standards to be applied to the attorney's conduct. In deciding
whether any conflicting interests of the clients require the lawyer to withdraw, Model
Rule 1.7 precludes continued representation in cases of direct adversity or when the at-
torney could not reasonably believe that representation of all clients would be free of
material limitation, while Rule 1.9 allows the former client to consent to continued repre-
sentation regardless of the nature or degree of conflicting interests. For a discussion of
the proper classification of family members as clients, see generally Teresa S. Collett, And
the Two Shall Become as One... Until the Lawyers Are Done, 7 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics
& Pub. Pol'y 101 (1993).
13. This hypothetical fact pattern was adapted from Batt, supra note 8, at 321. It was
one of the hypothetical fact patterns presented to the working group addressing in-
tergenerational conflicts at the Fordham Conference.
INTERGENERATIONAL REPRESENTATION
Avoiding conflicts' 4 while maintaining confidences"5 and independent
professional judgment'6 are the controlling ethical considerations in ac-
cepting representation of multiple family members in both the long-term
and new client situations. To maximize the possibility of ethical repre-
sentation, the mode of representation to be provided must be determined
at the outset. 17 The choices currently available to the client and attorney
are: (1) representation of only a single family member, requiring other
family members to seek representation by other lawyers;' 8 (2) representa-
tion as intermediary between clients;' 9 and (3) joint representation of
multiple individual family members.20 Legal commentators are sug-
gesting consideration of a fourth form of representation-representation
of the family as an entity.2'
This Article examines these four models and identifies inherent limita-
tions in each. Careful consideration reveals that only the first three mod-
els respect the traditional relationship between the individual client and
the attorney, preserving the decision-making autonomy of elderly clients
in the face of increasing pressures to surrender control of their assets, or
14. See Model Rules, supra note 4, Rules 1.7-1.9.
15. See Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.6.
16. See Model Rule, supra note 4, Rules 1.7 cmt. For an interesting discussion distin-
guishing avoiding conflicts and maintaining independent judgment, see Nancy J. Moore,
Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Representation of Multiple Clients" A Proposed
Solution to the Current Confusion and Controversy, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 211, 217-18 (1982)
("Although loyalty and independent professional judgment are not necessarily incompati-
ble, they are clearly different: the essence of loyalty is emotional commitment, while the
essence of independent professional judgment is intellectual detachment.").
17. See Malcolm A. Moore & Jeffrey N. Pennell, Practicing Whiat We Preach: Eso-
teric or Essential?, 1993 Inst. Est. on Plan. 1203.
18. Hereinafter referred to as "individual representation."
19. Hereinafter referred to as "intermediary representation" or "intermediation."
This mode of representation is defined and limited by the terms of Rule 2.2. See Model
Rules, supra note 4, Rule 2.2.
20. Representation of multiple individuals engaged in a common enterprise will here-
inafter be referred to as "joint representation." This term is used in cases defining the
evidentiary privilege that is afforded clients making disclosures in the presence of other
clients engaged in a common enterprise and seeking representation by a single lawyer.
See, ag., 8 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2312 (John T. Mc-
Naughton rev. ed. 1961 & supp. 1993).
21. Hereinafter referred to as "family entity representation." During preliminary de-
bates concerning the proper model for corporate representation, "group theory" com-
peted (unsuccessfully) with "entity theory" as the model to be adopted in what ultimately
became Rule 1.13. See I Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of
Lawyering, § 1.13:104 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1993) (discussing organizational representa-
tion). Case law often refers to joint or group representation as the "aggregate theory."
See Responsible Citizens v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756, 758 (Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that attorney's representation of individual partners does not automatically flow
from representation of a partnership).
22. Contrast the current practice of inter vivos gifts for medicaid and estate planning
purposes with the biblical wisdom:
Let neither son nor wife, neither brother nor friend, have power over you as
long as you live. While breath of life is still in you, let no man have dominion
over you. Give not to another your wealth, lest then you have to plead with
him; far better that you should look to their generosity. Keep control over all
1994] 1457
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their lives.2 3 Individual representation provides the greatest measure of
protection for client confidences and attorney loyalty, while posing some
danger of isolating the client. Joint representation allows unified repre-
sentation of multiple family members in their dealings with non-family
members, but fails to accommodate fully competing individual consider-
ations related to the joint representation. Intermediation recognizes the
individual considerations of each family member, and emphasizes har-
monizing those interests in the context of representation that focuses
upon the adjustment or creation of a relationship among multiple clients.
Yet this model precludes continued representation when all interests can
not be harmonized, or when one family member no longer desires repre-
sentation. Family entity representation has been proposed in hopes of
allowing family interests to predominate over individual interests, and
allowing representation to continue regardless of the changing composi-
tion of the family entity. After careful consideration of the arguments
presented by its proponents, this Article concludes that family entity rep-
resentation offers few benefits not available under the current models of
representation. In its attempt to emphasize the very real benefits of an
understanding of family as more than a mere collection of competing
individual interests, it disregards the threat that such an understanding
poses to both family and individual autonomy when used to define the
responsibilities of lawyers to clients.
A. Determining Client Identity
It is necessary to identify the client and determine the model of repre-
sentation to be provided by the lawyer at the beginning of the representa-
tion. In deciding who the client is, it is important to consider both the
process of making that determination, as well as the substantive question
of who or what might properly be regarded as a client. A major compo-
nent in the process of identifying the client is discerning who should
make that decision. 24 Outside of the context of constitutionally man-
dated representation, 25 there are three options: (1) the lawyer will iden-
your affairs; let no one tarnish your glory. When your few days reach their
limit, at the time of death distribute your inheritence.
Sirach 33:20-24 (New American Bible) (apocrypha).
23. See Daniel Callahan, Setting Limits 133-38 (1987) (arguing that economic limita-
tions justify denial of certain medical care to the elderly); Judy Mann, When the Hospital
Sues to Pull the Plug, Wash. Post, May 31, 1991, at B3 (hospital sought court order
allowing withdrawal of 87-year-old comatose woman's feeding tube and ventilator over
family's objection which was based upon patient's previously expressed desires to con-
tinue care if such circumstances ever arose).
24. See Dzienkowski, supra note 11, at 748 n.38. ("It is a difficult aspect of regulating
the attorney-client relationship to determine when society should override multiple cli-
ents' choice of a single counsel.").
25. The constitutional guarantee of criminal defense counsel raises the question of
whether counsel can be imposed upon an unwilling criminal defendant. A divided
United States Supreme Court ruled that it could not. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806 (1975). Motivating the majority was a concern that forcing counsel upon any indi-
1458 [Vol. 62
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tify the client;26 (2) the person or people seeking legal services will
identify the client;27 or (3) the lawyer and the person or people seeking
legal services will jointly identify the client.28
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct seem to contemplate the
third option. Both the attorney and the prospective client must agree to
the representation before an attorney-client relationship is established.29
vidual necessarily denied that person the right to speak for himself and to control (albeit
misguidedly) all aspects of the presentation. See id at 833-34.
26. Allowing the lawyer to identify the client is consistent with the American tradi-
tion of allowing lawyers to accept or decline clients based primarily upon the lawyers'
personal predilections. See Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.2 cmt. ("A lawyer ordina-
rily is not obliged to accept a client whose character or cause the lawyer regards as repug-
nant."). By empowering the lawyer to make the decision, the lawyer is an independent
moral actor who controls the nature of the affiliation which he or she is willing to under-
take. This acknowledges the moral autonomy of the lawyer as an individual, separate
from the role of lawyer that he or she may have undertaken.
Independent of respecting the lawyer's moral independence, empowering the lawyer to
make the ultimate decision concerning client identity ensures that the decision will be
made by the one who has the greatest knowledge concerning the legal consequences of
any particular client identification. Often individuals seeking the assistance of the lawyer
outside of a litigation context are convinced that their situation is one that will be amica-
bly resolved through sincere and good faith dialogue among the family. While this is
often true, lawyers have a particular sensitivity to the very real possibility that dialogue
will not resolve all differences amicably and that ultimately individual family members
will be unpersuaded by the positions of others and thus seek individual representation for
purposes of a more adversarial resolution of the problem.
This sensitivity to the potential for conflict within the family poses a double-edged
sword when lawyers decide who the client is. One of the most consistent criticisms of
lawyers in this area is that conflict is too quickly assumed to exist and often exacerbated
by the involvement of attorneys in the problem-solving process. Rather than seeking to
make peace and maintain the unity of the family, lawyers too often encourage individuals
to assert their legal rights in the face of persuasive reasons that would counsel accommo-
dation of competing interests rather than sharply define spheres of individual rights. This
danger leads to the position that the person or people seeking representation might more
suitably identify the client and the nature of the representation to be undertaken.
27. See Russell G. Pearce, Family Values and Legal Ethics" Competing Approaches to
Conflicts in Representing Spouses, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1253 (1994). Allowing the person
or people seeking representation to decide the identity of the client is supported by three
basic arguments: (1) the person seeking representation will ultimately bear the most sig-
nificant consequences from the manner in which the client is identified; (2) the individuals
seeking representation have far greater knowledge about the history, dynamics, and deci-
sion-making process of the family; and (3) allocating this decision to the person or people
seeking representation acknowledges and respects the inherent dignity of every individual
by virtue of its reliance upon their autonomous decisionmaking.
This rule prevails in England where barristers accept clients in the order of their re-
quests for service. See Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the
Legal Ethics Codes, 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 241, 263 (1992).
28. See 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 21, § 1.2:302.
It has already been noted that no lawyer is legally required to accept any partic-
ular matter, save in the case of court appointment. This means that while Rule
1.2(b) approves the willingness of lawyers to represent clients and causes they
do not believe in, it does not reproach those who choose to reject matters on
moral grounds.
Id.
29. A formal attorney-client relationship is not necessary in order for the lawyer to be
1459
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This option accommodates both the prospective client's right to select
the attorney30 and the attorney's right to represent only those individuals
whom he or she desires.31 Ideally in this collaborative model, the pro-
spective client provides sufficient information about family history, dy-
namics, and decision-making processes for the lawyer to make an
informed decision to accept or reject representation of the person or en-
tity to be identified as the client. a2 Likewise, in this model, the lawyer
provides sufficient information about the models of representation avail-
able and the various persons or entities who could be identified as clients
for the person or people seeking representation to make an informed de-
cision about which person or entity, if any, should be the lawyer's cli-
ent.33 Either the prospective client or the lawyer can unilaterally decline
to initiate representation.34
Client identification is rarely at issue when the person seeking repre-
sentation contacts the attorney directly.35 This is most common in the
under limited duties to the person seeking representation. See, e.g., Togstad v. Vesely,
Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 693 (Minn. 1980) (concluding that an attorney-
client relationship existed when lawyer gave advice to the plaintiff and plaintiff relied
upon that advice); I Hazard & Hodes, supra note 21, § 1.3:106; Charles W. Wolfram,
Modern Legal Ethics § 6.3.2. (Student ed. 1986)
30. This right can be altered by contract. See Todd R. Smyth, Annotation, Duty of
Insurer to Pay for Independent Counsel When Conflict of Interest Exists Between Insured
and Insurer, 50 A.L.R.4th 932, 958-59 (1986 & Supp. 1993).
31. See Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 6.2 cmt ("A lawyer ordinarily is not obli-
gated to accept a client whose character or cause the lawyer regards as repugnant. The
lawyer's freedom to select clients is, however, qualified."). The qualifications referred to
include the need for unpopular cases or clients to be represented, and the lawyer's duty to
accept court appointments. See id.
32. When the client fails to be candid at the initial interview, but the attorney subse-
quently comes to learn the true circumstances surrounding the representation, the attor-
ney may withdraw from representation absent harm to the client or a court order
requiring continued representation. See Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.16; Monroe
H. Freedman, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics 57 (1990).
33. See Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1203-04 (Utah 1985).
For client consent to be adequate in a conflict of interest situation, the attorney
must not only inform both parties that he is undertaking to represent them, but
must also explain the nature and implications of the conflict in enough detail so
that the parties can understand why independent counsel may be desirable.
Id.; see also Roger W. Anderson, Informed Decisionmaking in an Office Practice, 28 B.C.
L. Rev. 225, 234 (1987) ("Before accepting the representation, the lawyer's obligation is
to educate all potential clients about the nature of these potential disputes."). Cf Lee A.
Pizzimenti, The Lawyer's Duty to Warn Clients About Limits on Confidentiality, 39 Cath.
U. L. Rev. 441 (1990) (discussing limits of attorney-client confidentiality).
34. The client continues to be able to reject representation even after the attorney-
client relationship is undertaken. See Wolfram, supra note 29, § 9.5.2 ("It is now uni-
formly recognized that the client-attorney contract is terminable at will by the client.").
See Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.16(b) (limiting discretionary withdrawal to cases
where withdrawal can be accomplished without adversely affecting the client); see gener-
ally Wolfram, supra note 29, § 9.5.3.
35. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Ethics in the Practice of Law 43 (1978) ("The client is
the troubled fellow who walks into the office, papers in hand, wanting someone to help
him in a legal matter."). Of course this clarity of client identity can be lost by subsequent
events during the representation. See Pascale v. Pascale, 549 A.2d 782, 784, 790-91 (N.J.
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long-term client scenario. Client identification is far more complex when
the initial contact is made by someone other than the person seeking
representation, or when several individuals meet with the lawyer initially.
When a person other than the individual seeking representation con-
tacts the lawyer, the lawyer must clarify the role of the liaison. It is
common in both estate planning and elder law for the lawyer to be con-
tacted by an adult child who requests an initial appointment for a par-
ent.16 Sometimes the child attends the meeting with the parent,3 ' and on
occasion even pays the parent's legal fees. 31 Each of these actions by the
child compounds the difficulty in identifying the client as the parent ex-
clusively. When the issues presented to the lawyer impact legal-recog-
nized interests of both parent and child, the lawyer has a clear obligation
to clarify the relationship to be established with each person. 39 The more
family members attending the initial meeting with the lawyer, the more
complicated it becomes to identify the client or clients and define the
nature and scope of representation.
B. Consequences of Client Identification
Determining who is the "client" is of critical importance because that
1988) (client directed attorneys to "deal directly" with son or accountant, and contact
with son led to court determination that an attorney-client relationship was formed).
36. See; e.g., Jennerson v. Schippel (In re Schippel's Estate), 218 P.2d 192, 195 (Kan.
1950) (discussing how prospective beneficiary of testator initially approached attorney
regarding preparation of testator's will); see also Mark Falk, Ethical Considerations in
Representing the Elderly, 36 S.D. L. Rev. 54, 54 (1991) (noting that, with increasing
frequency, elderly persons will be accompanied by younger relatives when initially visit-
ing attorneys).
37. The effect of this upon the attorney-client privilege is troubling. See Annotation,
Privilege as to Communications to Attorney in Connection with Drawing of Will, 66
A.L.R.2d 1302, 1312-13 (1959).
38. See Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.8(0. Rule 1.8(0 states:
(f) lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one
other than the client unless:
(1) the client consents after consultation;
(2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of profes-
sional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and
(3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as re-
quired by rule 1.6 [which discusses confidentiality].
Id; see also ABA Committee on Significant New Developments in Probate and Trust
Law Practice, Developments Regarding the Professional Responsibility of the Estate Plan-
ning Lawyer: The Effect of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 22 Real Prop., Prob.
& Tr. J. 1, 14 (1987) (examining the possible conflicts of interest when a conflict exists
between the person paying and the person receiving the lawyer's services).
39. Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 4.3 (dealing with unrepresented person); see also
Pascale v. Pascale, 549 A.2d 782, 784, 790-91 (N.J. 1988) (client directed attorneys to
"deal directly" with son or accountant, and contact with son led to court determination
that an attorney-client relationship was formed); Bohn v. Cody, 832 P.2d 71 (Wash.
1992) (en banc) (reinstating malpractice claim against daughter's attorney for losses
caused by daughter's failure to repay loan to parents where it was foreseeable that parents
would be harmed by such non-payment and where attorney had given unrepresented
parents information concerning loan).
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determination defines the duties of the lawyer. Professor Geoffrey Haz-
ard has identified the underlying thesis of the current system of legal
ethics as "us" versus "them." The "us" are lawyers and their clients.
The "them" are everyone else.' Even transactional practice can be seen
as fundamentally adversarial in nature because "any lawyer who coun-
sels a client, negotiates on a client's behalf, or drafts a legal document for
a client must do so with an actual or potential adversary in mind."'"
Lord Brougham eloquently expressed this perspective in his famous
statement while defending Queen Caroline:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all
the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all
means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons,
and, amongst them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in per-
forming this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the de-
struction which he may bring upon others.42
The client's interests are paramount. But even more than that, they are
the only proper object of consideration by the lawyer. No consideration
of others' interests, regardless of the importance of those interests, is
proper or even permissible, when adhering to this ideal of pure
partisanship.43
Some commentators have read the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct as incorporating this conception of the lawyer's duties.44 While this
interpretation of the Model Rules has been ably disputed,45 it remains
40. See Hazard, supra note 35, at 43. Hazard states:
The lawyer's professional responsibilities may not end with concern for his cli-
ent, but clearly they start there. Confidential information is a secret if it relates
to a client, valuable evidence if it relates to someone else. Conflict with the
client must be avoided, conflict with everyone else is what a lawyer is retained
to handle.
Id. This dichotomy is modified somewhat when the client has fiduciary responsibilities to
individuals whom Hazard identifies as "relevant others." See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analysis, 1 Geo. J. of Legal Ethics 15,
33-36 (1987).
41. Freedman, supra note 32, at 66. An example of this is that in drafting estate
planning documents, attorneys seek to preempt challenges from both taxing authorities
and disappointed individuals who had anticipated receiving some gift.
42. Wolfram, supra note 29, § 10.3.1 (quoting, 2 Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (1821)).
43. See Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704, 709 (Minn. 1962), provides an
example of conduct consistent with this understanding of the lawyer's duty. Defense
attorneys learned that the sixteen-year-old plaintiff had an aneurysm of which he was
unaware. Because the aneurysm might have been caused by the accident that led to the
litigation, defense counsel did not inform the plaintiff of their discovery, even though the
aneurysm was life threatening. David Luban comments upon this case in Lawyers and
Justice 11-16 (1988).
44. See David Luban, Lawyers and Justice, 393-97 (1988); Gerald J. Postema, Moral
Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 63, 73 (1980); Murray L.
Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 Cal. L. Rev. 669, 673
(1978); William H. Simon, The Ideology ofAdvocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. R. 29, 36-37.
45. See Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 27, at 276-78; Ted Schneyer, Moral
Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 Wis. L.Rev. 1529, 1529-72.
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beyond dispute that many lawyers believe that they have no right to con-
sider the interests of people other than their clients, and do so only reluc-
tantly and with great trepidation."
Yet when dealing with families, particularly families including an eld-
erly person, the extreme model of partisan representation does not ac-
commodate most clients' desires.47 Many elderly clients seek to
harmonize family relationships rather than destroy them.48  Many law-
yers specializing in estate planning and elder law aspire to create or en-
sure the continuation of loving, caring relationships rather than solidify
or encourage the development of antagonistic, individualistic stances.49
Thus the "devil take 'em" approach to non-clients inherent in the parti-
san model of representation often ill serves both the clients and the law-
yers in these areas of practice.
Because of dissatisfaction with the partisan model, an alternative
model is emerging (or to state it more accurately "reemerging")' which
But see David Luban, Lawyers and Justice, app. I (1988) (arguing that, while there may
be other schools of thought on interpretation of professional ethics, the conception that
the lawyer's duty is to his client first is largely dominant in interpretation of the Model
Rules).
46. See 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 21, § 1.1:203-1 ("Many lawyers and some
courts apparently believe that this concept [duty to non-clients] is antithetical to the tra-
ditions of the legal profession: they mistakenly believe that the lawyer's duty is one of
unconditional loyalty to the client, a loyalty that leaves no room for concern for anyone
else.").
47. Cf Lawrence A. Frolik & Alison P. Barnes, An Aging Population: A Challenge to
the Law, 42 Hastings L. J. 683, 702 (1991) (noting elderly's reliance upon family for
assistance).
48. See, eg., Estate of Koch, 849 P.2d 977 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993). Here the court
stated:
Throughout her life, Mary professed love for all of her sons. There is over-
whelming evidence, however, consisting of many letters written by Mary and
testimony by her relatives, friends, and doctors who examined and treated her,
that she was appalled and distressed for a period of 10 years prior to her death
by the disputes and lawsuits involving her sons and by the resulting
publicity....
On May 9, 1981, Mary wrote Frederick [one of four sons]: "All I want these
last years of my life are peace and harmony in my family and I hope and pray
that you will help me to mend bridges not destroy them." Mary expressed
identical thoughts in numerous other letters written to Frederick and William
[another son] and in many conversations with relatives and friends during the
last years of her life.
Id. at 983.
49. See Luther J. Avery, ACTEC Needs Ethics Rules, 16 ACTEC Notes 124, 126
(1990) ("Lawyers must re-examine their role as enforcers of rights and consider their role
as caregivers"); Gerald Le Van, Lawyers, Families and Feelings: Representing the Family
Relationship, Prob. & Prop., Jan./Feb. 1991, at 20-21; Thomas L. Shaffer, The Family as
Client-Conflict or Community?, 34 Res Gestae 62 (1990).
50. See David Hoffman, A Course of Legal Study 754 (2d ed. 1836). He states:
If, after duly examining a case, I am persuaded that my client's claim or defense
(as the case may be,) cannot, or rather ought not, to be sustained, I will
promptly advise him to abandon it. To press it further in such a case, with the
hope of gleaning some advantage by an extorted compromise, would be lending
myself to a dishonorable use of legal means, in order to gain a portion of that,
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has most recently been christened "socially responsible lawyering."31
Under the "socially responsible" model, the impact on third parties, and
even society at large, is an independent consideration in the attorney's
decisions during representation. Thus an elder law attorney operating
under this model might decline to assist a client in transferring assets to
the client's children in order to accelerate the client's eligibility for Medi-
caid assistance. The socially responsible lawyer might reason that Medi-
caid was established to assist the poor, not to insure the inheritance of
children of the middle-class. 2 Alternatively, the lawyer might urge a
client to engage in Medicaid planning because the lawyer believes that
society as a whole has an obligation to provide for its infirm, and con-
sumption of personal assets for long-term care delays the political pro-
cess of society recognizing this obligation.5 3
While illustrating the operation of the "socially responsible lawyer"
model, this example also illustrates one of its great weaknesses. "Soci-
ety" has no spokesman, or perhaps too many, to articulate its interests
coherently. 4 Can such interests be perceived objectively independent of
the attorney's moral system?55 If the letter of the law does not forbid
conduct, may the attorney assume the mantle of "society's" spokesman
and urge the client to forgo legally permissible conduct in order to incur
some benefit for the amorphous group identified as "society?" 5 6
These questions may diminish in magnitude when only considering
"family-responsible" representation, yet answering them remains a
daunting task. With the decline of the patriarchal structure within
American families, it is increasingly difficult to determine who speaks for
"the family." If different family members take varying positions con-
cerning a proposed course of action, what weight, if any, should the law-
the whole of which I have reason to believe would be denied to him both by law
and justice.
Id.
51. David Luban, The Social Responsibilities of Lawyers: A Green Perspective, AALS
Workshop on Professional Responsibility 57 (Oct. 14-16, 1993) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Fordham Law Review).
52. See Michael Bagge, Planned Impoverishment: Scylla and Charybdis for the Eld-
erly and Their Adult Children, 62 N.Y. St. B.J. 46, 49 (Feb. 1990); Joel C. Dobris, Medi-
caid Asset Planning by the Elderly: A Policy View of Expectations, Entitlement and
Inheritance, 24 Real Prop., Prob. & Tr. J. 1, 30-31 (Spring 1989).
53. Cf Robert N. Brown, The Rights of Older Persons 2 (2d ed. 1989) (American
Civil Liberties Union handbook) ("Continued advocacy is needed to assure that existing
[governmental benefits] programs fulfill their objectives [insuring the elderly's right to an
adequate income] and that needed enhancements are enacted."); see also Dobris, supra
note 52, at 30-31 (arguing that Medicaid should be available to everyone).
54. How would lawyers go about deciding whether Jesse Helms or Ted Kennedy (or
neither) speaks for "society"?
55. See Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 27, at 278-81.
56. These questions lead inevitably to the issues pondered by Stephen L. Pepper in
The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 4 Am.
B. Found. Res. J. 613 (1986) (noting the decline of other institutions that would impart
some sense of moral limitations to the client, and questioning the viability of an amoral
society).
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yer give to each position? To what extent, if any, does a particular family
member have a preemptive right to make certain decisions? Is there any
justification for a lawyer to consider the interests of any person other
than those of "the client"? The complexity of these questions has led
many lawyers to ignore them and hope that they never become an issue
in their practice.5 7
Alternatively, some thoughtful practitioners and academicians are per-
suaded that considerations concerning "family" motivate the vast major-
ity of both estate planning and elder law clients.5 8 These authors have
accepted the challenge of defining a "family-responsible" model of law-
yer-client relationships that serves both the interests of individual clients
and the family from which and within which the clients have their being.
Often their attempts have begun with a call to recognize the propriety of
representing the family as an entity. 9 As a prelude to evaluating the
effects of permitting family entity representation, it is important to un-
derstand the strengths and limitations of the models of representation
currently available. Individual representation is the simplest manner of
addressing the concerns of conflicts, confidentiality, and independence of
judgment. Intermediation and joint representation are more complex
and require the lawyer to engage in case-specific analysis to determine
whether the benefits of multiple representation outweigh the inherent
threats to the lawyer's loyalty and ability to maintain confidences and
independent judgment. Family entity representation attempts to obtain
the simplicity of the model of individual representation by treating the
interests of multiple family members as singular, while retaining the abil-
ity to counsel multiple family members. This Article examines each of
these models in turn.
II. FOUR MODELS OF REPRESENTATION
Elder clients who seek estate-planning advice from an attorney may
shape the scope of the attorney-client relationship to conform with one of
four models of representation: individual representation, representation
by an intermediary, joint representation, and family representation.
57. See Malcolm A. Moore & Jeffrey N. Pennell, Practicing What We Preach: Eso-
teric or Essential?, 1993 Inst. on Est. Plan. 12-8-12-10.
58. See Patricia M. Batt, The Family Unit as Client: 4 Means to Address the Ethical
Dilemmas Confronting Elder Law Attorneys, 6 Geo. J. of Legal Ethics 319, 339-41 (1992)
(arguing that the entity-as-client principle in Model Rule 1.13 should be applied to the
family unit); Gerald Le Van, Lawyers, Families and Feelings" Representing the Family
Relationship, Prob. & Prop., Jan./Feb. 1990, at 20 (discussing ethical rules as applied to
estate planning for husband and wife); Russell G. Pearce, Family Values and Legal Eth-
ics: Competing Approaches to Conflicts in Representing Spouses, 62 Fordham L Rev.
(1994); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 Tex. L. Rev.
963, 969-70 (1987) (describing the family unit as the client in an estate case).
59. See e.g., Russell G. Pearce, Family Values and Legal Ethics: Competing Ap-
proaches to Conflicts in Representing Spouses, in Ethical Issues in Representing Older




When viewed from the narrow perspective of avoiding conflicts of in-
terests, representation of only a single family member is the ideal. Pre-
mised upon an attempt to achieve "zero risk" of any impairment of the
lawyer's ability to serve his or her client loyally,' this model of represen-
tation requires the lawyer to represent only one family member or entity,
declining representation of all others.
Utilizing individual representation as the model for determining
proper conduct on the part of an attorney in Hypothetical 1, described
earlier in this article,6 ' the attorney would decline to represent anyone
other than Father as long as Father is a current client. Representation of
Child, the corporation eventually formed, and Mother would all be de-
clined as posing a threat to the lawyer's loyalty to Father. Similarly in
Hypothetical 2,62 individual representation would require the lawyer and
prospective clients to decide at the outset which individual the lawyer
would represent. If Husband is chosen as the client, under traditional
concepts of partisanship, the lawyer must seek to persuade the other fam-
ily members that Husband should remain at home. The lawyer is limited
in attempts to persuade other family members only by the rules con-
tained in article 4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct which
govern transactions with third parties. The lawyer's responsibilities to
the client are clear-advise Husband individually and privately,63 while
advocating his position to the other family members. These responsibili-
ties to the client do not change if another family member is selected to be
the lawyer's sole client, although the position the lawyer advocates may.
This limiting concept of individual representation is not required
under even a stringent reading of the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct. Rule 1.7 defines the lawyer's duty to avoid representation of con-
flicting interests. By its terms, the rule permits representation of multiple
clients with interests that may conflict in the future if: (1) the lawyer
determines that representation will not materially limit the ability of the
lawyer to serve the interests of both clients; and (2) all potentially af-
fected clients consent to the multiple representation.' 4 Adherence to this
rule requires the lawyer to speculate about both the nature of any future
conflicts in clients' interests and the likelihood that the conflict will actu-
ally occur.
Courts have differed concerning the permissible level of risk that may
60. See Kevin McMunigal, Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest Doctrine, 5 Geo.
J. Legal Ethics 823, 861-65 (1992).
61. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
63. Model Rule 2.1 describes the lawyer's duties while acting as an advisor, while a
combined reading of Rules 1.1 requiring competence and 1.6 outlining the duty of confi-
dentiality strongly suggests private meetings with the client.
64. See Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.7(a).
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be incurred in undertaking multiple representation.65 Limited case law
supports the notion that any recognizable future conflict of interest is
sufficient to require counsel to decline representation of more than one
client.6 A majority of courts and commentators has suggested that the
better rule prohibits multiple representation only when there is a substan-
tial risk that conflicting interests will emerge.67 Under the first view, rep-
resentation of multiple family members is virtually impossible due to the
complex web of rights, duties, and expectations that flow between family
members. 8 Under the second view, the lawyer need not automatically
assume that family members will fail in their duties, aggressively assert
their rights, or intentionally frustrate or be frustrated in their expecta-
tions. Marriage is not viewed as merely a divorce waiting to happen, nor
is every family presumed to be dysfunctional. Instead the lawyer is
called upon to engage in a case-specific analysis to determine the nature
of the relationship among family members who seek multiple representa-
tion. Under the terms of Rule 1.7, if the attorney reasonably concludes
that the relationship is and will continue to be predominantly harmoni-
ous, multiple representation is permissible if all clients consent.
Independent of whether the individual representation model is re-
quired under the Model Rules, accepting representation of only one fam-
ily member limits the type of ethical dilemmas that can arise during
representation. By representing only one family member, any threat that
the lawyer will be forced to withdraw due to an actual conflict of inter-
ests emerging is minimized. The least desirable time for a client to lose
his or her lawyer is when controversy erupts into direct adversity. If
65. Compare Haynes v. First Nat'l State Bank of N.J., 432 A.2d 890, 900 (NJ. 1981)
("A conflict of interest, moreover, need not be obvious or actual to create an ethical
impropriety. The mere possibility of such a conflict at the outset of the relationship is
sufficient to establish an ethical breach on the part of the attorney.") (citations omitted)
with Estate of Koch, 849 P.2d 977, 995 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993). The Koch court stated:
If we choose to adopt a highly theoretical analysis, it is possible to make an
elusive argument and 'find' a conflict. If, however, we take a down-to-earth,
real world, functional approach in which we insure that confidentiality is pre-
served and that the client's wishes are served, we are hard pressed to find any
ethical violation upon which additional legal arguments can be hinged.
d at 995. See generally McMunigal, supra note 60 (discussing conflicts of interest).
66. See Haynes v. First Nat'l State Bank of N.J., 432 A.2d 890, 900 (NJ. 1981).
67. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, § 201 (tentative draft
No. 3 1990).
68. Several duties and privileges flow between family members. For example, the law
recognizes a fiduciary relationship between parent and child as well as between husband
and wife. See e.g., Daffin v. Daffin, 567 S.W.2d 672, 678 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) ("the
relationship between husband and wife entails the highest trust and confidence and justi-
fies their mutual reliance"); Haynes v. First Nat'l State Bank, 432 A.2d 890, 899-900
(N.J. 1981) (finding fiduciary relationship between parent and child where former is testa-
trix of will and latter is principal beneficiary). Additionally several states have relative
responsibility laws requiring adult children to contribute to the support of indigent par-
ents. See generally Catherine D. Byrd, Relative Responsibility Extended: Requirement of
Adult Children to Pay for Their Indigent Parent's Medical Needs, 22 Family L.Q. 87, 87
(1988) (listing 27 states with "relative responsibility" laws).
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multiple representation is undertaken, and the conflict of interests ripens
into direct adversity of clients' interests, the lawyer must withdraw from
representing any of the joint clients in relation to the matter of joint rep-
resentation.69 This can be particularly damaging if any of the client-law-
yer relationships are long-standing and substantial. This prospect
becomes more remote with individual representation as the operational
model.
Separate from the benefits of reducing the risk of conflicting interests
and insuring continued representation, individual representation affords
the client greater informational and decisional privacy. Informational
privacy is enhanced in two ways: 1) the attorney has no conflicting duty
to provide information to another client that might entail unauthorized
disclosure of confidential information,7" and 2) the attorney's contact
with other family members will be more limited than if the attorney rep-
resented multiple family members, therefore reducing the possibility of
inadvertent disclosure of confidential information.7"
Decisional privacy is enhanced by the exclusion of other family mem-
bers from the formal decision-making process of the client. The client
may freely confide concerns and explore considerations that he or she
might be reluctant to express or consider in the presence of others. The
attorney also may feel more at ease in candidly communicating observa-
tions about family relationships or misgivings about the client's proposed
course of action. Proposed conduct by the client which is perceived as
unduly harsh or unfair can be questioned, without fear that the expres-
sion of such concerns subsequently will be used by other family members
to the client's disadvantage. Under the model of individual representa-
tion, the attorney's primary concern and care need only encompass the
individual who has been identified as the client.
This model of representation is premised upon an understanding of
legal ethics that emphasizes what Professor Thomas Shaffer has called
"radical individualism." 72 Radical individualism views an individual as
69. See Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.7 cmt., Rule 1.16.
70. For a full discussion of the conflicting duties of disclosure and confidence when
representing both spouses see Teresa S. Collett, Disclosure, Discretion, Deception: The
Estate Planner's Ethical Dilemma from a Unilateral Confidence?, Real Prop., Prob. & Tr.
J. (forthcoming Winter 1993).
71. See Teresa S. Collett, And the Two Shall Become As Ote... Until the Lawyers Are
Done, 7 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 101, 127-28 (1993). A collateral but im-
portant benefit of limiting conferences to only the attorney and client is avoiding any
waiver of the evidentiary privilege as to communications during the conferences.
72. See Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 Tex. L.
Rev. 963 (1987).
First, a lawyer's proper employment is by or for an individual. Second, employ-
ment by or for more than one individual is exceptional. Third, as a conse-
quence, multiple party employment is necessarily superficial. Finally, the
means for protecting.., the principle that employment is ordinarily and prop-
erly by or for individuals is ignorance ... of any facts known to one of the
individuals but not to the other.
Id. at 969.
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a collection of interests and rights that begin and end with the individual.
Family relationships are seen as a product of "contract and consent, of
promises and the keeping of promises-all the consensual connections
that lonely individuals use when they want circumstantial harmony.""
Because all interests and rights accrue to and derive from the individual,
the lawyer properly limits representation to only one person.
The interests and rights of other family members are relevant only to
the extent that the individual client considers them relevant. Absent
such consideration, the client is treated as if existing in complete isola-
tion, accountable only to himself or herself in determining the objectives
of legal representation. Conflicting claims that might otherwise engage
the attorney's attention and evoke at least some emotional support 4 are
minimized by the absence of any claims to the attorney's loyalty by other
individuals identified as clients.
Offsetting the advantages of individual representation are the disad-
vantages that flow from isolating the client."5 These include reducing the
amount of information available to the attorney in helping the client de-
termine objectives, and limiting the context for interpreting information
that the client provides. Any consultation with non-client family mem-
bers must be conducted in a manner which protects client confidences
and avoids creating an unintentional, but implied, attorney-client rela-
tionship. To the extent that the lawyer asks non-client family members
to compromise a legally recognized interest, the lawyer must guard
against overreaching that could vitiate the transaction. 6
Additionally, while autonomy is most popularly understood as the ca-
pacity to make decisions independent of any undue outside influences,
isolation itself can constitute an undue influence.77 When isolated, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain the true balance of interests that
prevails when returning to the more natural state of community or fam-
ily. While alone, it is easy to succumb to the false allure of total self-
centeredness. Yet when surrounded by family, it is sometimes difficult to
maintain an independence of interests that adequately expresses individ-
73. Id at 970.
74. See Jeffrey Pennell, Professional Responsibility: Reforms Are Needed To Accom-
modate Estate Planning and Family Counselling, 1991 U. Miami Philip E. Heckering
Inst. Est. Plan. 18-29.
75. See Shaffer, supra note 60, at 983 ("Collective isolation probably is not good polit-
ically, nor is it an adequate premise for a professional ethic that ignores the realities of the
communities that we, in our communal isolations, have.").
76. See Baltins v. Baltins, 212 Cal. App. 3d 66 (Ct. App. 1989) (divorce settlement
dividing property set aside because wife was thwarted in her attempts to obtain independ-
ent counsel); Hotz v. Minyard, 403 S.E.2d 634 (S.C. 1991) (lawyer sued for misrepresen-
tations made on behalf of father when discussing testamentary plan with daughter).
77. Cf McNeil v. McNeil, 76 N.E.2d 621 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947) (evidence of children
being denied access to testator was admissible to show undue influence); 79 Am. Jur. 2d,
Wills, § 484 (1975) (preventing testator from meeting with other people may be undue
influence).
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ual desires.7"
Isolating the client may also lead to over-dependence upon the only
other individual included in the private consultations-the lawyer. "
Case law dealing with allegations of undue influence in the area of inter
vivos and testamentary gifts recognizes this.80 Absent a preexisting deci-
sion concerning the objectives to be achieved, the influence of the lawyer
is intensely magnified in advising a client who has been separated from
other family members by the lawyer's refusal to accept multiple
representation.
The final criticism of this model is that it multiplies the legal effort
expended to achieve a family's objective. If the objective of the individ-
ual client affects the legal interest of other family members and if the
lawyer declines to represent more than one client, other family members
must either employ separate counsel to represent their individual inter-
ests, or proceed unrepresented. By employing separate counsel, legal
costs are necessarily increased. These costs may act as a barrier to access
to legal services, thus frustrating the family members' attempt to achieve
their objective through the use of the law.8" Alternatively, the increased
cost can be viewed as unnecessarily reducing family wealth for no pro-
78. See Marshall B. Kapp, Who's the Parent Here? The Family's Impact on the Au-
tonomy of Older Persons, 41 Emory L.J. 773, 795 (1992).
79. See Knutsen v. Krippendorf, 862 P.2d 509, 515 (Or. 1993) ("[A] finding of domi-
nance does not require evidence that an authoritative, controlling person bullied or di-
rected the actions of a subservient one. Dominance can be expressed more subtly, such as
by suggestion or persuasion or by fostering a sense of need and dependence."). Cf Wil-
liam J. Bowe & Douglas H. Parker, Page on the Law of Wills § 15.4 (rev. ed. 1960) ("A
suggestion by one who occupies a dominant position in the relation of trust and confi-
dence, such as an attorney, may amount to undue influence, although such a suggestion,
if made by a stranger, would not amount to undue influence.").
80. See 79 Am. Jur. 2d, Wills, § 444 (1975) ("Denial of access of relatives at the time
the testator makes his will is always considered a circumstance of more or less weight
tending to prove undue influence[.]") (footnote omitted). see also Duckett v. Duckett, 134
F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1943). The Duckett court stated:
A jury might reasonably decide that appellee, after taking sole charge of testa-
trix, first made false statements to other relatives with the purpose and effect of
inducing them not to visit her and then allowed her to suppose, contrary to the
fact, that they were making no efforts to see her, doing nothing for her, and
showing no interest in her welfare. In our opinion such conduct would consti-
tute both fraud and undue influence.
Id. at 528. Cf. Bowe & Parker, supra note 79, § 14.7 ("False statements of relatives of
testator, made to induce them to stay away, and representations to testator that such
relatives stayed away through lack of affection and interest, constitute fraud.").
81. E.g. Estate of Koch, 849 P.2d 977, 998 (Kan. App. 1993) ("Legal services must be
available to the public in an economical, practical way, and looking for conflicts where
none exist is not of benefit to the public or the bar."). Cf In re Brownstein, 602 P.2d 655,
657 (Ore. 1979). The Brownstein court stated:
This court does not say that a lawyer cannot put together small transactions in
which the amounts involved are not large enough to justify the expense required
for each interested party to have individual representation. However, when
such a transaction is handled, it should be with extreme caution and with a
clear and explicit understanding concerning whom the lawyer represents.
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ductive purpose. In addition to increased legal costs, involvement of
multiple lawyers often changes the focus of representation from achiev-
ing a common goal through cooperation among individual family mem-
bers to preserving individual interests without regard to the collective
cost such preservation entails.82
In those instances when other family members forgo separate represen-
tation, there is a significant risk that such forbearance is not merely an
attempt to minimize legal costs. Rather, family members may decline to
seek other counsel, based upon an unexpressed belief that neither the
client nor the lawyer would harm the interests or expectations of the
unrepresented family member. While neither the client nor the lawyer
may intend to harm the interests of these family members, in hindsight
any diminution of the unrepresented family members' interests often will
be perceived as a betrayal of trust.83
On balance, strict adherence to the model of individual representation
minimizes the risk that the lawyer's loyalty to the client will be compro-
mised by competing claims and insures continued representation during
periods of conflict with other family members. Also it enhances informa-
tional and decisional privacy. Inherent in this form of representation,
however, is the risk of isolating the client. This model minimizes contact
with the client's family members which might provide necessary infor-
mation and context to client communication. Isolation creates a substan-
tial danger that, absent clear client objectives and desires, the client will
give the lawyer's opinions and moral assessment disproportionate weight.
Increased participation by multiple lawyers, often a byproduct of this
model, indiscriminately increases the costs of achieving family objectives,
and threatens the creation of adversarial relationships when none had
previously existed. By representing only one family member, the attor-
ney risks claims by unrepresented family members of overreaching or
exerting undue influence in establishing and accomplishing the client's
objectives.
B. Representation as Intermediary
Responding to clients' desires for multiple representation by counsel
with whom the family is familiar, and to avoid the increased costs and
82. See Harold Demsetz, Toward A Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev.
347-57 (Pap. & Proc. 1967), reprinted in Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, Property 42
(3d ed. 1993). Professor Demsetz discusses the role of law in assuring that property
owners consider the full impact of their uses of the property rather than merely the im-
pacts which they personally experience.
83. See Bohn v. Cody, 832 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1992) (en bane) (attorney's failure to ad-
vise parents to seek independent counsel is betrayal of trust). Cf. Briggs v. Wyoming
Nat'l Bank, 836 P.2d 263, 265 (Vyo. 1992) (husband's failure to seek independent coun-
sel to review agreement drafted by wife's attorney resulted in binding waiver against his
interest); Brooks v. Zebre, 792 P.2d 196, 201 (Wyo. 1990) (rejecting malpractice claim of




contentiousness that involvement of multiple lawyers might bring, many
lawyers agree to represent multiple family members. This representation
takes two forms-joint representation and intermediation. Joint repre-
sentation involves assisting multiple clients in establishing or adjusting a
relationship with non-clients. Representing co-plaintiffs or co-defendants
is a common example of joint representation. Acceptance of clients and
conduct of the lawyer during joint representation is governed primarily
by Rules 1.4,84 1.6,85 1.7,86 and 2.1.87
In contrast, Rule 2.2 governs the lawyer's conduct when engaged in
intermediation. Although the text of the rule does not define intermedia-
tion, the commentary provides some insight on this point:
A lawyer acts as intermediary under this Rule when the lawyer rep-
resents two or more parties with potentially conflicting interests. A
key factor in defining the relationship is whether the parties share re-
sponsibility for the lawyer's fee, but the common representation may
be inferred from other circumstances. Because confusion can arise as
to the lawyer's role where each party is not separately represented, it is
important that the lawyer make clear the relationship.
A lawyer acts as intermediary in seeking to establish or adjust a rela-
tionship between clients on an amicable and mutually advantageous
basis; for example, in helping to organize a business in which two or
more clients are entrepreneurs, working out the financial reorganiza-
tion of an enterprise in which two or more clients have an interest,
arranging a property distribution in the settlement of an estate or me-
diating a dispute between clients. The lawyer seeks to resolve poten-
tially conflicting interests by developing the parties' mutual interest.
The alternative can be that each party may have to obtain separate
representation, with the possibility in some situations of incurring ad-
ditional cost, complication or even litigation. Given these and other
relevant factors, all the clients may prefer that the lawyer act as
intermediary.8 8
The language of the first paragraph would support application of Rule
2.2 in all cases of multiple representation, but such a construction would
render Rule 1.7, governing conflicts of interests between current clients,
meaningless. In order to avoid this result, emphasis must be placed upon
84. See Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.4 (setting forth the duty to communicate
with clients). Reading Rule 1.4 in conjunction with Rule 2.1, which concerns the law-
yer's duties as advisor, a lawyer must give a client all relevant information that he or she
is aware of. See Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 2.1. The conflict between the duty to
give information and the duty to maintain confidences when representing spouses is fully
explored in Collett, supra note 70.
85. Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.6 (describing the lawyer's duty of
confidentiality).
86. See Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.7 (outlining prohibited transactions arising
from conflicts of interests with or among present clients).
87. See Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 2.1 (governing the lawyer's conduct as an
advisor).
88. Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 2.2 cmt.
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the language in the second paragraph of the quotation. Under this con-
struction intermediation involves assisting clients in establishing or ad-
justing a relationship between them. It entails representation of multiple
clients who have "sought the services of one lawyer to help them resolve
differences or execute a transaction between or among themselves."89
Before a lawyer may act as an intermediary, four conditions must be
met. The lawyer must obtain informed consent from each client after
having explained the advantages and disadvantages of common represen-
tation.9" Independent of that consent, the lawyer must
reasonably believel] that the matter can be resolved on terms compati-
ble with the clients' best interests, that each client will be able to make
adequately informed decisions in the matter and that there is little risk
of material prejudice to the interests of any of the clients if the contem-
plated resolution is unsuccessful. 91
Having concluded that the requisite three beliefs are reasonable, and hav-
ing obtained the clients' informed consent, the lawyer may act as inter-
mediary. While acting as an intermediary, the lawyer must be impartial
as to the competing interests of the individual clients, and must avoid any
"improper effect on other responsibilities the lawyer has to any of the
clients.",92
Application of this model to the two hypothetical fact patterns yields
strikingly different results from the application of the individual repre-
sentation model. By definition, when acting as an intermediary, the law-
yer represents multiple clients. In Hypothetical 1,11 the lawyer appears to
act as an intermediary in advising Father, Child, and the corporation.
As the relationship of Father and Child with the corporation changed,
the lawyer facilitated that change or adjustment. The lawyer did not act
as an intermediary merely by agreeing to represent Child in estate plan-
ning, while currently representing Father. Absent some interest of Fa-
ther's that was affected by Child's estate plan, representation of Father
and Child as to Child's estate planning was merely simultaneous repre-
sentation.94 Simultaneous representation differs from joint representa-
89. Dzienkowski, supra note 11, at 775; see also Collett, supra note 12, at 116-19
(suggesting that lawyers rarely act as intermediaries when representing both spouses for
estate planning purposes, since such representation focuses on adjusting the clients' rela-
tionship with non-clients rather than between themselves).
90. See Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 2.2 (a) (1).
91. Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 2.2 (a) (2).
92. Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 2.2 (a) (3).
93. See supra text accompanying note 12.
94. Depending upon the nature of the estate planning, the conclusion could change.
If a child's estate planning includes the drafting and execution of a shareholders' agree-
ment with Father, the lawyer would be acting as an intermediary if representing both
Child and Father as to that matter. See Pascale v. Pascale, 549 A.2d 782, 783 (NJ. 1988)
(father attempted to set aside transfer of stock in family business to son due to lawyer's
representation of both father and son); see also Maryland St. B. Ass'n Op. 85-18 (un-
dated), in ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct (1980-85) (determining
that under the Maryland version of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyer
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tion and representation as intermediary because the matters for which
the attorney has accepted representation are totally independent. In Hy-
pothetical I when Child sought assistance with estate planning, he or she
was neither seeking to adjust the relationship with Father by the estate
planning process nor seeking to join with Father in a common endeavor.
In Hypothetical 2 the family is expressly seeking assistance in deter-
mining the proper manner of assisting a family member who is included
in the deliberations. Due to the inclusion of Husband in the decision-
making process, the proper classification of the role that the lawyer is
being asked to fulfill is intermediary. The lawyer is being asked to accept
Husband, Wife, and both children as clients, in their attempt to redefine
their relationship in light of Husband's declining health. It is this "in-
ward-looking" nature that distinguishes intermediation from joint repre-
sentation. Had Husband not been included in the consultation, nor
intended to be the lawyer's client, Wife and the adult children would be
joint clients of the lawyer, once they had defined their common objective
as to Husband. This is because the representation would be "outward
looking," in attempting to persuade Husband, a non-client, to comply
with the clients' requests. 9
5
In the context of representing multiple family members, the intermedi-
ary model of representation emphasizes harmony over discord, and unity
over isolation. Its candid recognition of existing differences in the indi-
vidual desires and interests of clients at the beginning of the representa-
tion requires both clients and counsel to assess whether there is a realistic
prospect of voluntarily reconciling those interests. Only if such a pros-
pect exists is counsel allowed to go forward with the intermediation.96
Additional benefits from this model include reduced transaction costs
in the form of reduced legal fees,97 and increased sources of information,
often giving the attorney a fuller understanding of the situation. Disloy-
alty to any individual client is protected against by the mandate of Rule
2.2 that representation of all clients terminate if representation of one
terminates. Representation as intermediary must terminate upon the
withdrawal from representation of any single client, or when the attorney
determines that the relationship of the clients has changed in such a man-
ner that the four preconditions to intermediation no longer exist. 98 This
is most likely to occur by the lawyer deciding that it is no longer reason-
able to believe that the matter can be resolved "on terms compatible with
who, after advising client on estate planning, is consulted by client's father regarding
father's estate, shall not reveal to either client his representation of the other, nor is such
undisclosed simultaneous representation necessarily an impermissible conflict of interest).
95. Cf Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 211 cmt. b (Tentative
Draft No. 4, 1991) (making similar distinction between representation of multiple clients
"with common interests" and multiple clients with differences to be resolved).
96. See Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 2.2(a)(2).
97. See Dzienkowski, supra note 11, at 765.
98. See Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 2.2(c).
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the clients' best interests."99
This forced termination of all representation is required whether or
not the client terminating the representation would consent to continued
representation of the others. This restriction on further representation
renders Rule 2.2 more strict than the rules governing individual or joint
representation. Under these other models, new representation is con-
trolled by Rule 1.9, which allows continued representation on the same
or a substantially related matter with the consent of the former client,
even if such representation is "materially adverse" to the interests of the
prior client.1"0 Rule 2.2's bar on continued representation when the for-
mer client would give informed consent is the greatest disadvantage to
intermediation.
An example of the unnecessary harshness of the termination rule is
where the attorney agrees to act as intermediary in the intergenerational
transfer of a family business. Father and Mother are exclusive owners
prior to this representation and seek to transfer ownership to Son and
Daughter and their respective spouses. Lawyer agrees to act as interme-
diary on behalf of Father, Mother, Son, Daughter-in-law, Daughter, and
Son-in-law. Midway through the intermediation Son and Daughter-in-
law divorce. Daughter-in-law is satisfied with the division of marital
property and makes no claim to the family business. She is willing to
consent to Lawyer continuing the intermediation among the family with-
out her participation. Rule 1.9 would allow Lawyer to continue repre-
sentation, but Lawyer must withdraw from representing all family
members because he or she is acting as an intermediary and bound by
Rule 2.2.
Other disadvantages inherent in the intermediary model include the
absence of any external check upon the fairness of the result,"0' and the
possibility that intermediation will result in a compromise of individual
interests that would not have occurred with individual representation.'
All rights to confidentiality and attorney-client privilege may be waived
as between the clients involved in the intermediation, although the com-
mentary to Rule 2.2 suggests that it may be possible to preserve some
limited rights.10 3 Additionally, should intermediation fail, each individ-
99. Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 2.2(a)(2). This assumes that the "best interests"
are identified as the individual best interest of each client, rather than the collective best
interest of the group. Professor Dzienkowski provides a thorough analysis of this point
and concludes that the drafters intended individual best interests to be the relevant test.
See Dzienkowski, supra note 11, at 791-98.
100. See Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.9.
101. See Dzienkowski, supra note 11, at 777.
102. See iL
103. The comment to Rule 2.2 provides:
A particularly important factor in determining the appropriateness of interme-
diation is the effect on client-lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-client privi-
lege. In a common representation, the lawyer is still required both to keep each
client adequately informed and to maintain confidentiality of information relat-
ing to the representation. See Rules 1.4 and 1.6. Complying with both require-
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ual must seek new counsel. This is not only costly in terms of time and
money, but also may result in terminating long-standing attorney-client
relationships that individual clients want to preserve.
When compared to the model of individual representation, in the con-
text of intergenerational representation of family members, intermedia-
tion avoids the dangers inherent in isolating the client. Intermediation is
inclusive, while individual representation is exclusive. The operational
premise of the intermediary is accommodation of others' interests. The
operational premise of the lawyer for the individual is indifference to
them.
This last distinction is both a strength and weakness of the intermedi-
ary model. Should Husband accommodate the interest of his adult chil-
dren in the preservation of his estate? Should he accommodate the
interest of Wife in preserving her health? If accommodation should be
made, how far should that accommodation go-placement in a long-
term facility, acceptance of substandard care to reduce costs and main-
tain his assets? In contrast, individual representation insures that the
client's individual interests are always the object of the attorney's atten-
tion. It guarantees that the client can depend upon continued representa-
tion if family members oppose him or her. Finally, individual
representation affords the client the opportunity to communicate can-
didly with counsel, knowing that the communications will be held in
confidence and protected by the attorney-client privilege." ° The inter-
mediary can make no such assurances.
C. Joint Representation of Multiple Individuals
Joint representation occurs when multiple clients seek representation
in adjusting or creating a relationship with non-clients. Such objectives
can be sought through adversarial proceedings, in which the clients are
ments while acting as intermediary requires a delicate balance. If the balance
cannot be maintained, the common representation is improper. With regard to
the attorney-client privilege, the prevailing rule is that as between commonly
represented clients the privilege does not attach. Hence, it must be assumed
that if litigation eventuates between the clients, the privilege will not protect any
such communications, and the clients should be so advised.
Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 2.2 cmt. For a discussion specifically addressing confi-
dentiality in the context of intermediation, see Dzienkowski, supra note 11, at 803-14.
For a general discussion of attorney-client privilege and common representation, see Paul
R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States § 4:36 (1993), 8 John Henry Wig-
more, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2312 (John T. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961),
and Restatement (Third) The Law Governing Lawyers, § 125 (Tentative Draft No. 2
1989). See generally Collett, supra note 70, (discussing the conflict between an attorney's
duties to keep clients informed and maintain confidentiality).
104. This last point is a traditional justification of strong enforcement of the duty to
maintain confidences. Limited empirical evidence suggests, however, that client disclo-
sures are not made in direct reliance upon the duty of confidentiality or the existence of
the attorney-client privilege. See Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 Iowa
L. Rev. 351, 396 (1989).
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co-plaintiffs or co-defendants, 0 5 or through negotiations, in which the
clients seek a common resolution of a matter involving non-clients. 6
Model Rules 1.4, 1.6, 1.7, and 2.1 are the principle rules concerning the
acceptance and conduct of joint representation.
Model Rule 1.7(b) establishes the standard the attorney must employ
in deciding whether joint representation is possible:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another
client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not
be adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation
of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consulta-
tion shall include explanation of the implications of the common
representation and the advantages and risks involved. 10 7
Clearly the rule requires the attorney to assess whether loyal representa-
tion of all interests is possible. This is done through the risk analysis
described earlier in this Article; in this analysis the lawyer considers
whether there is a risk that his or her loyalty to any individual client will
become impaired due to the representation of others.' If a risk exists,
and if it is substantial, the lawyer should not undertake representation
regardless of the clients' willingness to consent."° 9
105. An example given in the Reporter's Note of the Restatement (Third) of The Law
Governing Lawyers is representation of family members joined as co-plaintiffs in a
wrongful death suit to recover for the loss of another. See Restatement (Third) of The
Law Governing Lawyers § 209 cmt. d(i) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1991) (citing Hurt v.
Superior Court, 601 P.2d 1329 (Ariz. 1979) (In Bank) (permitting common representa-
tion of wife and child in suit seeking to recover for wrongful death of husband-father)).
106. Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers § 211 cmt. c (Tentative
Draft No. 4, 1991) deals with representation of multiple clients in non-litigated matters.
The non-litigious situations involving joint representation as defined by this Article are
discussed in Comment c "Assisting clients with common interests":
When multiple representation by a lawyer involves clients who have common
interests with respect to issues, at least at the outset, the role of the lawyer is to
advise on relevant legal considerations, suggest alternative ways of meeting
common objectives, and perhaps draft instruments necessary to accomplish the
desired results. Such multiple representation may not even present a conflict of
interest requiring client consent. See § 201. Many such representations will,
however, involve at least a potential conflict. At minimum, each client's right
to communicate in confidence with the attorney should not be lost by inadver-
tence. See § 125. While a lawyer should not try to suggest discord where none
exists, when a material conflict is reasonably foreseeable, the lawyer must be
sure that all affected clients are informed of the advantages and risks to them of
the multiple representation and have given uncoerced consent. See § 202.
Id. The example given is the counseling of Husband and Wife in the drafting of recipro-
cal wills.
107. Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.7(b).
108. See supra notes 60-83 and accompanying text.




When family members seek any form of concurrent representation,' 10
the attorney should consider the potential for conflicting interests inher-
ent in the representation of family members, due to the duties and privi-
leges of family members recognized by the law."' When joint
representation is sought, the lawyer must reasonably believe that any po-
tentially conflicting individual desires are subordinate to the clients'
desires to achieve a common goal. Absent such a belief, the risk of cli-
ents' interests diverging and becoming directly adverse renders it impos-
sible for the lawyer reasonably to believe that multiple representation will
not materially limit the lawyer's ability to serve each client faithfully.
If the lawyer reasonably believes that the clients' desires to achieve a
common goal dominate their other individual desires and that no other
aspect of the clients' relationship poses a substantial risk of impairing the
lawyer's loyalty and independent judgment, joint representation is per-
missible if the clients give informed consent.
In obtaining their informed consent, clients must be advised of the ad-
vantages and risks entailed in joint representation." 2 Possible advan-
tages of joint representation are: (1) the presumption of harmonious
objectives after the initial determination that the common objective pre-
dominates; (2) pooling of information and resources relevant to attaining
the desired objective; (3) complete coordination of individual legal posi-
tions;' 1 3 (4) reduced legal fees;" 4 and (5) a limited right to continued
representation if one member of the group terminates representation.
The limited right of continued representation can accrue either be-
cause continued pursuit of the previous common objective is not adverse
to the interests of the client terminating personal representation, or be-
cause he or she consents to continued representation of the remaining
clients. 1 I An example of nonadverse continued representation would be
where an attorney represented multiple family members in their attempt
to purchase a vacation home from a third party. If one family member
terminated representation because of a change in his or her financial abil-
ity to participate in the proposed purchase, the attorney could continue
representing the remaining family members because such representation
would not be adverse to the interests of the terminating family member.
Continued representation is also possible even when it is adverse to the
110. Concurrent representation is any representation of two or more clients during the
same time period. As used in this Article "simultaneous representation" is concurrent
representation in totally independent matters; "representation as an intermediary" is con-
current representation with the goal of creating or adjusting the relationship between the
clients; and "joint representation" is representation with the goal of creating or adjusting
the clients' relationship with non-clients.
111. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
112. See Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.7(b)(2).
113. See Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers, § 209 cmt. b (Tentative
Draft No. 4, 1991).
114. See id.
115. See Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.9.
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interests of the client terminating representation if that client consents.
For example, a lawyer accepts representation of multiple family members
in their efforts to accelerate distribution of an estate. Unfortunately one
of the clients suffers severe financial reverses, and any distribution be-
coming available would be transferred immediately to creditors. The in-
solvent client reasonably decides that delayed distribution is in his or her
best interest. If the client terminates the representation of his or her in-
terests but consents to continued representation of the other family mem-
bers who still desire immediate distribution of the estate, the attorney
may continue to represent the remaining clients.
This result differs from the result required when the attorney acts as an
intermediary. Rule 2.2, governing the attorney's conduct as intermedi-
ary, completely prohibits continued representation pertaining to the sub-
ject matter of the intermediation if representation of any client ceases. " 6
In contrast, Rule 1.9 controls continued representation when the repre-
sentation is joint, and only prohibits continued representation when such
representation is adverse to the interests of the former client in the same
or a substantially related matter." 7 And this prohibition can be waived
by the former client."' 8
Possible disadvantages of joint representation include: (1) release of
the attorney's duty of confidentiality" 9 and waiver of any evidentiary
privilege between clients; 120 (2) withholding of relevant information by
the attorney if an individual family member discloses information ad-
verse to the common objective; (3) failure to consider options other than
the common goal due to a misperception of unswerving commitment to a
common objective;' 2' and (4) loss of independent judgment by the attor-
ney due to fear of creating disharmony or prejudicing an individual fam-
ily members. 122
116. See Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 2.2(c); supra text accompanying notes 97-
100.
117. See Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.9(a).
118. See id
119. See Shapiro v. Allstate Ins. Co., 44 F.R.D. 429, 431 (E.D. Pa. 1968) ("Counsel
represents both [the insured and the insurance company], and, at least in the situation
where the policy-holder does not have separate representation, there can be no privilege
on the part of the company to require the lawyer to withhold information from his other
client, the policy-holder."); Henke v. Iowa Home Mut. Casualty Co., 87 N.W.2d 920, 924
(Iowa 1958) ("It would be shocking indeed to require an attorney who had assumed such
a duty to act for the mutual benefit of both or several parties to be permitted or compelled
to withhold vital information affecting the rights of others because it involves the
informant.").
120. 8 John H. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 2312 (John T. McNaughton rev. ed.
1961).
121. Cf. Lovett v. Estate of Lovett, 593 A.2d 382 (N.J. 1991) (will contestants unsuc-
cessfully argued that presence of testator's wife resulted in attorney limiting advice to
testator).
122. See Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest in the Simultaneous Representation of
Multiple Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion and Controversy, 61 Tex.
L. Rev. 211, 219 (1982).
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This listing of advantages and disadvantages reflects the difficulty in
complying simultaneously with the duty to give relevant information to
joint clients derived from Rules 1.4 and 2.1, while preserving client confi-
dences in conformity with Rule 1.6. The limited case law dealing with
this issue reflects a strong trend in favor of finding implied consent to
disclose relevant information by virtue of the agreement to be jointly rep-
resented. 123 This conclusion is compatible with both the law of evi-
dence 1 24 and the most sensible construction of agency law., 25
The relevant section of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers, however, suggests that the duty to maintain an individual confi-
dence may be superior to the duty to give information to other joint cli-
ents when the confidence contains information "clearly antagonistic to
the interests of another co-client" or when the confiding client explicitly
directs the attorney not to disclose the information. 26 This position,
while finding limited support in case law, 127 appears to be the minority
view and is contrary to the very rationale the authors of the Restatement
give for recognizing a co-client privilege:
First, co-clients probably understand that all information is to be
shared with all co-clients .... Second fairness between the co-clients
themselves and between the lawyer and each of them precludes the
lawyer from keeping information secret from any one of them, unless
each affected co-client explicitly agrees that a communication is to re-
main secret from the consenting co-client.128
Implied consent and fundamental fairness are given as the rationale for
the co-client (or joint) privilege in virtually every treatise on the law of
evidence. 29 The authors of the Restatement offer no justification for rec-
ognizing a secret unilateral revocation of the implied consent, nor do
123. See Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States § 4.36 (1993);
John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 91 (4th ed. 1992); 8 John H. Wigmore, Wig-
more on Evidence § 2312 (John T. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
124. See 8 John H. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 2312 (John T. McNaughton
rev. ed. 1961).
125. See Collett, supra note 70.
126. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 125(e) (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1989).
127. The case cited in the commentary to the Restatement is Eureka Inv. Corp. v.
Chicago Title Ins. Co., 743 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
128. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 125(e) (Tentative Draft
No. 2, 1989).
129. E.g. John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 91 (4th ed. 1992). This treatise
states:
In the first place the policy of encouraging disclosure [of information to attor-
neys] by holding out the promise of protection seems inapposite, since as be-
tween themselves neither would know whether he would be more helped or
handicapped, if in any dispute between them, both could invoke the shield of
secrecy. And secondly, it is said that they had obviously no intention of keep-
ing these secrets from each other, and hence as between themselves it was not
intended to be confidential.
Id.; see also Paul R. Rice, supra note 123, § 4.36 (1993); 8 John H. Wigmore, Evidence
§ 2312 (John T. McNaughton ed., 1961).
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they provide any explanation of why the antagonistic nature of the confi-
dence alters the claim of fundamental fairness by the non-confiding
client.
Regardless of the ultimate position taken upon the substantive issue of
whether, in all instances, the duty to give clients relevant information or
the duty to maintain confidences controls, prospective joint clients
should be advised of the conflicting duties as a part of obtaining informed
consent. The existence of any ambiguity on this point is another charac-
teristic that distinguishes joint representation from intermediation. Rule
2.2 is clear in its mandate that the clients remain fully informed or that
intermediation cease, while Rules 1.4, 1.6, 1.7, and 2.1 contain only con-
tradictory admonitions.
The distinctions between intermediation and joint representation may
be less important than may first appear, however. Often it is necessary
for an attorney to provide both forms of representation to clients being
jointly represented. This is true because, while joint representation can
only be undertaken when the clients' common goal predominates, clients'
individual interests are not extinguished, nor the lawyer's duty to attend
to them. As representation progresses, differences in opinion and interest
emerge, often in response to the changing posture of the non-client.'
When such differences emerge, the attorney often acts as an intermediary
in harmonizing the clients' positions in order to determine the next ac-
tion to be undertaken in relation to non-clients.' 3 ' When the lawyer
shifts from joint representation to intermediation, it seems that the law-
yer should comply with the standards contained in Rule 2.2. Yet appli-
cation of Rule 2.2 suggests that by seeking to reconcile emerging client
differences in order to represent their collective interest effectively, the
lawyer forfeits the limited freedom to continue representation if one cli-
ent should terminate representation. Instead of the partial constraints of
Rule 1.9, the attorney becomes subject to the "out-for-one, out-for-all"
principle contained in Rule 2.2. This creates a strong disincentive for the
lawyer taking an active role in assisting joint clients to resolve their dif-
ferences. Whether this is the intended outcome, and more importantly
whether this is the proper result, is open to serious doubt.
D. Representation of the Family as an Entity
Dissatisfied with the isolation resulting from individual representation,
the abandonment virtually required if any client decides not to proceed
with intermediation, and the false unity of interests presumed by the joint
130. Building upon an earlier example of joint representation, this shift in roles would
necessarily occur if the family seeking to purchase a vacation home made an offer on a
house, and that offer was countered by the seller. If Father wanted to make a counter-
offer to the seller, and Child thinks the seller's offer should be accepted, the lawyer is
acting as an intermediary in attempting to reconcile the clients' positions.
131. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, § 209(b) (Tentative
Draft No. 4, 1991).
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representation model, commentators have searched for another model of
representation that would more fully serve the needs of elderly clients
and their families. The most recent proposals consider the family as an
entity. Advocates of representing the family as an entity have looked to
Rule 1.13 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as an example of
what a rule permitting representation of the family entity might look
like.' 3 2 Rule 1.13 defines the professional duties of lawyers representing
organizations. 133 The existence of this rule reflects the bar's recognition
of unique problems faced by lawyers representing non-human jural per-
sons-primarily corporations.1
34
The primary problem unique to such representation is that the client is
unable to communicate with its lawyer. Human agents, or "constitu-
ents,"135 speak on its behalf and define the objectives of representation. 36
In the normal course of events, this arrangement poses little difficulty
because the agents most often act in the best interest of the entity.'37 But
the lawyer must decide what to do if the agent
is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related
to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the or-
ganization, or a violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to
the organization, and is likely to result in substantial injury to the
organization. 1 38
Model Rule 1.13 requires that the lawyer "proceed as is reasonably nec-
essary in the best interest of the organization."'139 In undertaking this
independent course of action this rule instructs the lawyer to seek to
"minimize disruption to the organization and the risk of revealing infor-
mation relating to the representation to persons outside the
organization." 40
Commentators have found this ability to proceed in the best interests
of the entity, independent of any express directive of the constituents,
132. See Pearce, supra note 59, at ; Batt, supra note 8, at 339-41.
133. See Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.13.
134. By its terms Rule 1.13 can be applied to any group of individuals that constitute
an organization. Hazard and Hodes note:
While most of the debate over the entity theory and Rule 1.13 proceeded [dur-
ing the process of the adoption of the Model Rules by the American Bar Associ-
ation] as if only the status of corporate lawyers was at stake, it should be
remembered that the same analysis applies not only to corporations but to labor
unions, unincorporated associations, governmental units and other formal orga-
nizations with established chains of command.
1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 21, § 1.13:103.
135. Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.13 cmt.
136. See 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 21, § 1.13:102.
137. See id. § 1.13:106 ("In the vast majority of cases the lawyer can safely accept
direction from her co-agents, for the same concept of agency that assigns an independent
role to the lawyer also assigns important roles to highly placed individuals in the organi-
zation's structure.").
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attractive when struggling with the problems of family representation.' 4'
They argue that this approach accurately reflects the experience of many,
if not most, clients-that family is something more than the voluntary
association of individuals.'42 Similar to corporate lawyers, these attor-
neys regard the family as existing beyond the sum of its individual con-
stituents.143 Like a corporation, the family is unable to communicate
directly with counsel and must rely upon its constituents to speak on its
behalf. At any given time the family's interests may diverge from the
individual interests of specific family members.
Yet, the family relationship is more fundamental than any divergence
of individual interests. Within this relationship exists the potential for
harmonious resolution of any potential dispute. At a minimum, advo-
cates of family entity representation argue, attorneys should be allowed
to represent families by seeking to realize the harmony rather than the
discord within the family.'44 When the human agents of the family en-
tity direct action that amplifies the discord and mutes the harmony, these
commentators propose that the lawyer "proceed as is reasonably neces-
sary in the best interests of the family," which, by its very terms, means
conducting the representation in such a way that the harmonious ele-
ments of the family representation build to a crescendo, while the disso-
nant elements fade into silence.' 4 5
Supporters also argue that family entity representation is desirable be-
cause individuals desire such representation. Respect for client auton-
omy requires that lawyers be able to provide the form of representation
sought by individuals, absent some compelling policy to the contrary.' 46
Assuming that the family seeks representation as an entity for lawful
purposes, 147 and assuming that the family is adequately informed of the
risks and advantages of such representation, 4 " the lawyer should be able
to provide such service.
Finally, commentators argue that entity representation is currently be-
ing provided by thoughtful practitioners in spite of its ambiguous stand-
141. See Batt, supra note 8, at 339-40; Pearce, supra note 59.
142. See Pearce, supra note 59; Shaffer, supra note 3, at 971.
143. The irony of suggesting that corporations, creatures of legal fiction, exist more
"clearly" than families does not escape the author.
144. See Pearce, supra note 59.
145. Batt, supra note 8, at 340-41; Pearce, supra note 59. Note the difference from
Rule 1.13 in the formulation of when independent action by the lawyer is justified. See
supra notes 133-40 and accompanying text.
146. See Dzienkowski, supra note 11, at 748 n.38 ("It is a difficult aspect of regulating
the attorney-client relationship to determine when society should override multiple cli-
ents' choice of a single counsel."); Moore, supra note 16, at 234.
147. See Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.2(d) ("A lawyer shall not counsel a client
to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent[.]").
148. The requirement that the prospective client be advised of the risks and advantages
of such representation is analogous to that imposed under 2.2 prior to acting as an inter-
mediary between clients.
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ing under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 149 The existence of
such a wide-spread practice, with only limited evidence of harm to indi-
vidual clients' interests,1 50 suggests that, with proper safeguards, entity
representation is possible and desirable.
By embracing the model of entity representation, it is contended that
families will enjoy the same benefits afforded other "organizations": an
advisor committed to the best interests of the entity;15 1 judicious use of
information provided by individual family members in order to benefit
the family entity; 15' and continuous representation, regardless of the dis-
agreement or departure of any individual constituent (family member, in
this instance). 153
III. A CRITIQUE OF FAMILY ENTITY REPRESENTATION
This attribution of benefits to the family-entity model disregards the
experience of practitioners representing families who have adopted the
formal organization of a corporation for purposes of pursuing their busi-
ness interests. Both case law and commentary reflect the confusion that
has resulted from reliance upon the entity theory where the organization
is comprised of only family members or a small number of individuals,
most of whom have strong personal interests in the day-to-day conduct
of the organization.154 This confusion results from the reasonable per-
149. See Le Van, supra note 58, at 20; Morre & Pennell, supra note 17, 1 12-9; Pearce,
supra note 59.
150. No commentators in favor of the entity theory have fully addressed the existence
of case law originating from "family" representation in which an individual asserts harm
to his or her personal interests. Cases evidencing such harm include Hotz v. Minyard,
403 S.E.2d 634, 637 (S.C. 1991) (daughter sued lawyer for breach of fiduciary duty due to
lawyer's misrepresentation of the continuing validity of father's will), and Florida Bar v.
Betts, 530 So. 2d 928, 929 (Fla. 1988) (disciplining lawyer for guiding comatose client's
hand in signing codicil reinstating client's daughter based upon belief that client should
not have excluded her).
151. This differs from the intermediary model where the lawyer must serve the best
interests of the individual clients. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
152. Cf I Hazard & Hodes, supra note 21, § 1.13:107. They state:
Information given to the lawyer by agents of the entity must be made available
to the entity when it is in the best interest of the entity as a whole to know it, for
part of the lawyer's duty is to keep his client (the entity) apprised of develop-
ments. By the same token, confidential entity information in the lawyer's pos-
session normally must not be communicated to a 'constituent' (a fellow
employee, for example), whose responsibilities do not require that he know the
information. In other words, dissemination of confidential information, even
within the entity, and even absent intramural disputation, is proper only to the
extent that the entity has impliedly authorized disclosure in order to carry out
the representation.
Id.
153. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
154. See Responsible Citizens v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756 (Ct. App. 1993);
Whitfield, 231 Cal. App. 3d 692 (Ct. App. 1991); Fassihi v. Sommers, Schwartz, Silver,
Schwartz & Tyler, P.C., 309 N.W.2d 645 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Sturm v. Sturm, 574
N.E.2d 522 (Ohio 1991); Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & In re Conduct of Brandsness,
702 P.2d 1098 (Or. 1985); In re Brownstein, 602 P.2d 655 (Or. 1979); see also Lawrence
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ception by the participants in a close or family corporation that the entity
is merely the alter ego of the shareholders, and thus the entity's lawyer is
also counsel to each shareholder.
Unlike the close or family corporation, constituents are rarely con-
fused about the independent identity of the publicly owned corporation.
Shareholders in publicly owned corporations are primarily passive inves-
tors, with little control over the corporate management.15 5 Officers, di-
rectors, and other management personnel may or may not be investors in
the company. With few exceptions, management in publicly owned cor-
porations operates the company absent any direct oversight by the other
constituents. 156
This management by surrogates, combined with the inability of the
corporation to speak on its own behalf, creates a vulnerability on the part
of the organization that may justify a more activist role for counsel.157
Both the attorney and the organizational management are merely agents
of the principal, which is the corporation.' The attorney has no duty of
loyalty to other agents which would supersede the duty of loyalty due to
the principal.1 59 When corporate agents propose conduct that is harmful
to the interests of the corporation, the attorney, by virtue of his or her
own duty of loyalty, must act to protect the entity.
An important testing case is when a lawyer employed by a corporation
reluctantly concludes that a high official in the corporation is working
against the entity's interest. The lawyer would have great difficulty
"taking sides" if that official, as well as other constituents of the organ-
ization, were equally considered to be his clients. In the face of an
irreconcilable conflict of interest under the group theory [whereby the
lawyer for the corporation is engaged in multiple representation of the
individual constituents], the lawyer would usually be forced to cease
representing any member of a constituent group, including the entity
K. Mitchell, Professional Responsibility and the Close Corporation: Toward a Realistic
Ethic, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 466 (1989); Note, An Expectations Approach to Client Identity,
106 Harv. L. Rev. 687 (1993).
155. See Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Law § 1.2.4 at 22 (1986).
156. Professor Clark refers to this separation of ownership and control as "centralized
management." Id at 23.
157. Even this activist role is limited, however, within the rules of professional con-
duct, by requirements that counsel seek to minimize both the disruption to the organiza-
tion and the risk of revealing information relating to the representation to persons outside
the organization.
158. It is difficult, but important, to recall that the principal is the legal person of the
corporation, not the shareholders. As Professor Clark notes:
[Tihe relationship between shareholders and directors is not well described as
being between principals and agents. (A principal is ordinarily understood to
be one who has the power to direct the activities of his agent.) Shareholders not
only may not initiate or countermand specific business decisions of the manag-
ers, but they do not, may not, and, some would say, should not determine the
corporation's ultimate goal, its specific lines of business, its business strategies,
or even the identity of the top officers who actually manage it.
Clark, supra note 155, at 22-23.
159. See Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 428 cmt. b (1958).
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itself. By contrast, the lawyer would have no formal conflict of loyal-
ties under the entity theory, for he was only on one "side" to begin
with. He would be required to stay loyal to his only client-the entity;
that, in turn might well require him to be "disloyal" to a particular
individual. Although in human terms such a 'betrayal' might be very
distasteful, it is a legally correct and necessary consequence of the well-
established principles of agency law upon which the entity theory
rests. 160
In contrast the current legal conception of family does not rest upon
the principles of agency law. Family members do not act as agents of
"the family."' 16 1 Unlike a corporation, there is no broad concept of
"family" as an independent legal person within American jurisprudence.
While the state creates fictional legal persons, 162 families exist independ-
ent of the state. 63 Legal recognition of fictional persons rests upon the
political determination that the public good is promoted by permitting
individuals to conduct their affairs through a disembodied entity, "
while legal recognition of the family rests upon the political reality that
commitment to family preexists and preempts commitment to political
community. 
65
The significance of these distinctions becomes apparent when compar-
ing the case law concerning the fullest personification of a legal fiction,
the corporation, and the jurisprudence surrounding the family. 6 6 Cor-
porations are defined by statute and are clearly distinguishable from
other business associations. The legal definition of family grows more
nebulous daily.' 67 Corporate law presupposes that the purposes of the
160. 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 21, § 1.13.104 at 393.
161. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 22 cmt. b (1958) ("Neither husband nor
wife by virtue of the relation has power to act as agent for the other."). But see R.E.
Barber, Modern Status of Family Purpose Doctrine with Respect to Motor Vehicles, 8
A.L.R.3d 1191, 1201 (1966) ("Insofar as proponents of the family purpose doctrine have
attempted to justify it in the light of traditional legal doctrine, they have continuously
and consistently relied upon a supposed agency relationship between owner and
user ... ").
162. See Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (4 Wheat.) (1819) ("A
corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation
of law."); see also Clark, supra note 155, § 1.2.3.
163. See Mary A. Glendon, The Transformation of Family Law 5 (1989).
164. E.g. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (1919); Clark, supra note 155,
§ 1.2, ch. 16.
165. See Mary Ann Glendon, supra note 163, at 5 ("Families and marriages are pre-
legal institutions."). The existence of a spousal privilege supports this conclusion.
166. Other fictional legal persons exist, but vary dramatically in the degree of personifi-
cation recognized by the law. See Clark, supra note 155, § 1.2.3.
167. Compare Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1974) (upholding
zoning restriction which partially defined family as individuals related by "blood, adop-
tion or marriage") with Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481
U.S. 537, 545 (1987) ("Family" as a protected relationship "presupposes 'deep attach-
ments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares
not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively
personal aspects of one's life.' ") (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
619-20 (1984)). Even more amorphous is the definition provided in McKinney v.
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corporation can be generalized as seeking to maximize profits for its
shareholders.168 Contemporary family law largely refuses to acknowl-
edge any presupposition concerning "family purposes."' 69
To the extent that contemporary law can be said to recognize the fam-
ily by imposing duties as well as granting rights, it is primarily through
its recognition of individuals in marital and parental relationships . 70
Parents are not generally liable for the torts of their children,' 7' and,
with few exceptions, any parental support obligation ceases when the
child attains majority.' 72 Adult children are rarely responsible for the
support of their parents,'73 and they are not liable for parental acts. 74
Unlike a corporation which is directly liable for illegal or ill-conceived
corporate conduct, but shields its individual constituents from personal
liability,175 family members will be held personally liable for an illegal or
negligent act taken on behalf of the family instead of the family entity. 7 6
Hughbanks (In re Hughbanks), 506 N.W.2d 451, 455 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (affirming use
of statutory form of jury instruction defining family as "a group of people living in the
same household under one management," against challenge that "the definition is far too
broad and vague and would be inclusive of persons living under one roof, even though
they were not blood related, not a dependent of another for income tax reporting, or
bound to perform any duties or hold any responsibilities as a household member").
168. See Clark, supra note 155, ch. 16.
169. A discussion of the cultural context of family expectations and purposes is outside
the scope of this Article. However this factor alone cautions against empowering a law-
yer, most often a member of the dominant culture in a multi-cultural society, to override
the expressed objectives of family members. See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14,
26 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (criminal statutes forbidding the transport of women
across state lines for immoral purposes should not be applied to Mormon family com-
posed of husband and multiple wives because such application was an illegitimate intru-
sion of the state into the "cultural institution" of marriage).
170. See Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 575 (Tenn. 1993) (reversing trial court order
allowing grandparent visitation over parents' objections where there was no challenge to
parental fitness). In the absence of stable parental relationships, courts have recognized
the rights of non-parents and relatives on the basis of a family relationship.
171. See Wade R. Habeeb, Annotation, Parents' Liability for Injury or Damage Inten-
tionally Inflicted by Minor Child, 54 A.L.R.3d 974, 977 (1973).
172. Cf Noralyn 0. Harlow, Annotation, Postmajority Disability as Reviving Parental
Duty to Support Child, 48 A.L.R.4th 919 (1986) (discussing the exception to the general
rule).
173. But see Ann Britton, America's Best Kept Secret: An Adult Child's Duty to Sup-
port Aged Parents, 26 Cal. W. L. Rev. 351, 351-52 (1990); Catherine D. Byrd, Relative
Responsibility Extended. Requirement of Adult Children to Pay for Their Indigent Par-
ent's Medical Needs, 22 Faro. L.Q. 87, 90 (1988).
174. See Max Stier, Note, Corruption of Blood and Equal Protection: Why the Sins of
the Parents Should Not Matter, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 727 (1992). Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942) (declaring sterilization of "habitual criminals" unconstitutional).
175. Eg. Barte v. Home Owners Cooperative, 127 N.E.2d 832 (N.Y. 1955) ("The law
permits the incorporation of a business for the very purpose of escaping personal liabil-
ity[.]"); see also Clark, supra note 155, § 1.2.1.
176. Compare King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 320-28, 335-36 (1968) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) (discussing disqualification of families from Aid to Families with Dependent
Children program on the basis of parent's moral character) with Wright v. Ohio Dept. of
Human Servs., No. 92 CA 15, 1993 WL 97791 (Ohio Ct. App. March 26, 1993) (holding
that reducing future Aid to Dependent Children payments to family proper, since reduc-
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While limited exceptions can be found, 77 a unified concept of "the fam-
ily" as a legal entity separate from the individual relationship is difficult
to discern, while the concept of a corporation as a separate legal entity is
increasingly refined. 7 '
Disregarding these distinctions and assuming arguendo that families
can be properly regarded as entities separate from the relationships be-
tween individual family members, what would be the result of recogniz-
ing these entities as potential clients for purposes of representation? If a
limited analogy of the family to a corporation is accepted, the corporate
form most similar to the family is the close corporation, 179 and more
specifically, the family corporation.S0 Cases and commentary concern-
ing representation of these corporations are instructive when considering
expansion of the concept of entity representation to families.
In re Banks'' is the seminal case in this area, and most clearly illus-
trates the difficulties arising from attempts to represent the family corpo-
ration as an entity independent of its constituents. In 1965 two
attorneys, Banks and Thompson, began representing Mr. and Mrs.
Michel, and the Michels' corporation, United Medical Laboratories
("UML"). At the beginning of the representation all UML stock was
owned exclusively by the couple, but subsequently, as part of their estate
planning, Mr. and Mrs. Michel made gifts of stock to their two daugh-
ters.' 2 The business grew dramatically from 1965, when the business
was largely conducted from the basement of the family home, to 1972 at
which time UML employed over 1500 people.
Unfortunately this rapid growth was complicated by business
problems, the most significant of which was difficulty in operating a new,
expensive computer system intended to automate certain aspects of the
company's operation. These difficulties resulted in UML borrowing op-
tion was made in order to recoup previous overpayment made due to father's failure to
report additional income). Cf. Misenheimer v. Misenheimer, 325 S.E.2d 195, 198-99 n.2
(N.C. 1985) (discussing American repudiation of the common law concept of "corruption
of the blood" which precluded certain felons from receiving or transmitting property by
inheritance). See generally Stier, supra note 174, (arguing that the corruption-of-blood
principle, in which children should not be made to pay for the sins of their parents, merits
explicit recognition and consistent application).
177. The spousal relationship is treated as independent of the two spouses in a minor-
ity of jurisdictions that still recognize tenancy by the entireties, and "the community's"
interest is often referred to in states adopting community property laws as their method
of regulating marital property. Surviving spouses and dependent children are protected
by family allowances and homestead in many states.
178. See generally Gary S. Rosin, The Entity-Aggregate Dispute: Conceptualism and
Functionalism in Partnership Law, 42 Ark. L. Rev. 395 (1989) (analyzing the struggle to
define the legal status of partnerships properly).
179. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Professional Responsibility and the Close Corporation:
Toward a Realistic Ethic, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 466, 487 (1989) (discussing family
corporations).
180. See id.
181. 584 P.2d 284 (Or. 1978) (in banc).
182. As a result of these gifts, stock ownership ultimately was distributed 29 shares in
Mr. Michel, 29 shares in Mrs. Michel, and 21 shares in each daughter. See id. at 285.
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erating funds. In 1972, the company was approximately $3,000,000 in
debt to the bank, with other past due bills.
In an effort to relieve the pressure [from creditors] and to break the
logjam caused by the computer, Michel directed the computer techni-
cians to remove certain limits or safeguards from the computer which
had been set by the medical directors employed by the corporation. As
a result, 60,000 test results were spewed out, the accuracy of which
was doubted by the medical directors. As a consequence of this action,
high level employees became concerned about the moral aspect of the
accuracy of the published test results as well as their personal responsi-
bility therefor and were threatening to go to the federal agencies which
licensed and regulated medical testing laboratories. Mrs. Michel's and
her daughters' concerns about the removal of the computer safeguards
and about the solvency of the company and its ability to meet its debts
caused, for the first time, a confrontation between Michel and the
members of his family. For the first time his absolute control was
questioned. As a result, Michel made the tactical mistake of physically
assaulting his wife. 183
By his "tactical mistake" of assaulting his wife, Michel evidenced his
absolute identification with the corporation. Questioning a clearly bad
business decision was the functional equivalent of attacking his very per-
son. 8' Although his physical response was unjustified, it is not beyond
understanding.
Mr. Michel then sought to insure his control of the UML, by obtaining
his wife's stock. Mrs. Michel agreed to assign the stock to him, but that
same day "slipped away from her husband" and went to the home of one
of their daughters. 8 5 Upon discovering her location, Mr. Michel went to
the daughter's home where another confrontation occurred, this time re-
sulting in Mr. Michel's assaulting his daughter.186
Mr. Michel returned to his home where he found Thompson, the fam-
ily/corporate attorney, awaiting him. Thompson was directed to go to
the daughter's home "to see what was going on."' 87 What was going on
was a consultation by the daughters and Mrs. Michel with another attor-
ney concerning how to curb Mr. Michel's control of the corporation,
183. Id at 286. The opinion earlier characterized Mr. Michel as "a completely domi-
nating force" in UML, running the business "as his private fief." Id. at 285.
184. Gerald Le Van has noted this identification of person and corporation as typical
in the entrepreneurial personality. See Gerald Le Van, Passing the Family Business to the
Next Generation Handling Conflict, 1988 Inst. on Est. Plan. 14-1. "In one sense his busi-
ness is the founder's alter ego, his self-image. He may have trouble distinguishing his self-
image from the business. If his children make good faith suggestions for changes in the
business, he may take them as personal criticism." Id. at 14-9.
185. In re Banks, 584 P.2d at 286.
186. See id. At this point the reader might well wonder about the nature of the "as-
saults"-whether they were simply "secondary violence" such as attempts to roughly
push past a person blocking Mr. Michel's intended path where the primary motivation is
something other than to do violence to the person, or whether they were aggressive physi-




while isolating themselves "from constant confrontation with him, since
they did not feel they could emotionally withstand such
confrontation."18 8
Ultimately the daughters and wife decided to place their stock in a
voting trust, the trustees of which voted to elect a new board of directors,
all of whom were unrelated to the stockholders, with the exception of
Mr. Michel who retained his seat on the board. The new board allowed
Mr. Michel to retain his position as president of the corporation, but
attempted to exercise control over him by creating a system of internal
checks. Thompson, continuing in his role as corporate counsel, advised
Mr. Michel as UML's executive officer and provided reports to the board
regarding the problems of the corporation. By the end of the first month
of this new regime, it was clear that Mr. Michel was unwilling to observe
the balance of power that the board had attempted to create.
The final conflict between the board and Mr. Michel as executive of-
ficer erupted when Mr. Michel refused to subordinate the interest of a
related corporation he controlled to the interests of UML's bank in order
to secure UML's indebtedness further. At the request of the board of
directors, Thompson rendered an opinion that this refusal violated Mr.
Michel's employment agreement with UML. Based upon this opinion
the board placed Mr. Michel on a leave of absence.' 8 9
Shortly after this event Mr. and Mrs. Michel reconciled, and Mrs.
Michel decided she had made a mistake in transferring her stock to the
voting trust. She retained counsel on this matter, and she ultimately
brought suit challenging the legality of the voting trust and the election
of the new board of directors. Defendants included the daughters, the
trustees of the voting trust, and the new board of directors. UML was
not a defendant. Thompson's partner Banks agreed to defend the law-
suit.190 The case was never litigated because the parties agreed that Mr.
Michel should attempt to sell the business.
He was successful in selling it for $10,000,000. The new owners re-
tained Mr. Michel to operate the company, whereupon he "cleaned
house," firing all those he perceived as having been disloyal to him dur-
ing the corporate battle. These firings included the law firm in which
both Thompson and Banks were partners.
The fired law firm then undertook legal representation of the dis-
charged employees of UML in setting up a competing business. 19' Banks
and Thomas personally became investors in the new business venture as
well. Whatever defense of the prior conduct by Thompson and Banks
could be constructed upon the concept of loyalty to the family and cor-
porate entity is completely undermined by their agreement to engage in
this subsequent behavior. Oblivious to the disloyalty inherent in their
188. Id. at 287.





actions, Banks even went so far as to render a legal opinion concerning
the enforceability of the no-compete agreements with UML entered into
by the prior employees.192
Disciplinary proceedings were commenced; however, the trial board
and the Disciplinary Review Board determined that the lawyers had not
engaged in unethical conduct. The Supreme Court of Oregon disagreed.
In determining that the attorneys had engaged in unethical multiple rep-
resentation of conflicting interests the court observed:
At the time of the drawing of the contract Michel was the corporation.
As he expressed himself when, at the beginning of the difficulty, he was
asked to resign by an employee, "I told him that I had made the com-
pany and that I would destroy the company." The stock had been
distributed among the members of the family, but, for practical pur-
poses, it was his corporation. He was in absolute control and substan-
tially all the immediate benefits of the business could be made to flow
to him through his contract for compensation. Nor can we differenti-
ate between Michel and his wife. He was the completely dominant
marital partner at the time the contract was drawn. Until the events
which precipitated the confrontation, the participation of the other
members of the family in corporate activities was whatever Michel
wanted it to be. It is a small wonder that as a layman Michel was
completely outraged when he found that the attorneys he thought he had
hired to protect his interest, both personal and corporate, which interests
were substantially identical, were opposing him in a dispute calling into
question the application of the legal work he had hired them to do. 193
Five years later a California appellate court was confronted with a
similar situation in which a wife asserted that the attorney for the family
corporation represented her personal interests. In Woods v. Superior
Court of Tulare County,194 counsel represented the family corporation
for approximately eight years prior to wife filing suit for divorce. During
that time, the lawyer also had represented husband and wife individually
in a number of related matters. When the husband sought to have corpo-
rate counsel represent him individually in the divorce proceedings, the
wife objected. As evidence of her personal trust in the lawyer, the wife
alleged "that after she learned her husband was having an extramarital
affair, she met with Mr. Kralowec [the attorney for the corporation] in
his office with no one else present and exposed some of her most inner
feelings regarding her personal relationship with her husband."' 95 The
attorney denied the meeting ever occurred.
The attorney argued that representation of the husband in the divorce
proceeding was proper because all prior representation had been in his
capacity as counsel to the corporation. Any actions not formally taken
in the corporation's name were still motivated by representation of the
192. See id at 287-88.
193. Id at 290-91 (emphasis added in part and original in part).
194. 149 Cal App. 3d 931 (CL App. 1983).
195. Id at 933.
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corporation, and thus should be considered a part of the corporate repre-
sentation.1 96 The actions not taken in the corporation's name included
the drafting of the wife's will and representation of her individually in
litigation where she was the named defendant. Accepting the attorney's
construction of the prior representation, the court held that representa-
tion of a family corporation necessarily encompasses individual represen-
tation of the shareholders. 197 Subsequent California case law retains this
holding as to family corporations but refuses to extend it to other close
corporations where the shareholders are unrelated.198
Professor Lawrence Mitchell is one of the few commentators to con-
sider the ethical problems experienced by counsel to a close corpora-
tion. 199 Focusing upon the close corporation where most, if not all,
shareholders are active in corporate management, Professor Mitchell
suggests that the difficulty in applying the entity theory to close corpora-
tions lies in its fundamental misconception of the organization.
There has been a significant re-evaluation and recasting of the [sub-
stantive] laws governing close corporations during the last forty years.
The most significant result has been the general recognition that the
shareholders of a close corporation are considered partners in their
dealings with one another and that the corporation is an entity only
with respect to the rest of the world. Certainly that is the objective of
the participants. Consequently, application of the entity theory, with
its underlying concepts of corporate democracy, is ill-suited to the eco-
nomic and human behavior of these shareholders and to their
expectations.2°
Just as "underlying concepts of corporate democracy" are ill-suited to
close corporations, they do not reflect family decision making. It is re-
pugnant to think that a decision such as the one described in Hypotheti-
cal 2,201 concerning institutionalization of an elderly family member,
should be controlled exclusively by majority vote. 20 2 This excludes all
consideration of the fact that the institutionalized family member will
bear the greatest burden of complying with the decision. Only when
there is an equality of interests should majoritarian principles control.
When decisions impose greater harm or burdens upon identifiable per-
sons, those people should have greater control over the decision-making
process.20 3
196. See id. at 935-36.
197. See id. at 936.
198. See Responsible Citizens v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756 (Ct. App. 1993).
199. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Professional Responsibility and the Close Corporation:
Toward a Realistic Ethic, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 466, 467 (1989).
200. Id. at 468-69 (footnotes omitted).
201. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
202. But see Batt, supra note 8, at 340 ("Like the organization's attorney, the elder
lawyer should represent the 'best interests' of the family as determined by the objectives
set out by the majority of family members.").
203. Cf David Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study 344 (1988) (describing
the "own-mistakes" principle requiring that groups be allowed to make their own mis-
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It is not a sufficient answer to this objection to allow the clients to
define the decision-making process for the entity at the outset; thus bind-
ing the attorney to honor this decision-making process by virtue of his
acceptance of representation." Such an answer requires clients to artic-
ulate prospectively a decision-making process to be employed by the fam-
ily in making such diverse decisions as whether to purchase a new home
or withdraw the respirator from Grandma. This is both unrealistic and
unfair.
Additionally, advance binding description of the decision-making pro-
cess presumes a rigidity that is non-existent. Behavior patterns change
over time, and family members enter and leave the decision-making
group. To require clients constantly to assess whether the attorney
should be notified of new decision-making processes in order to confirm
his or her willingness to continue the representation is undesirable and
unworkable.
In addition to the problems in defining a mechanism for decision mak-
ing, Professor Mitchell notes several other problems when using the en-
tity theory to define the responsibilities of the close corporation's lawyer:
The Codes [the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct] purport to tell her [the lawyer] who
her client is, but their failure to account for the impact of the substan-
tive law on this problem renders their dictates meaningless. Based
upon the traditional adversary model of the lawyer's role, the Codes
allow counsel to represent multiple parties when the lawyer's duties of
undivided care and attention and undivided loyalty will not be com-
promised. This approach presents a much less significant problem in
the case of the public corporation, for the MRPC (and to a lesser de-
gree the CPR) is predicated explicitly upon the entity theory of the
corporation, a theory which retains vitality in the public context.
Modem law, however, has largely stripped the close corporation of its
entity mask with respect to intracorporate relations, so that counsel to
a close corporation will no longer have an entity interposed between
her and the ultimate owners of the business.2°5
Expansion of the entity theory to include family representation would
suffer from this difficulty also. In the absence of a coherent jurisprudence
recognizing the family entity as separate from the aggregate interests of
the individual members, the lawyer attempting to represent the family
will have no universally recognized legal entity interposed between coun-
sel and individual family members. Unlike Rule 1.13, which emerged as
a response to the well-developed substantive law concerning the legal
takes in order to secure the goods internal to political action). However, the right to have
greater control necessarily includes the right to decline control. Thus, the stereotypical
"little woman" who declines to express an opinion because she values submission to her
husband more than influence in family decisions is entitled to be silent.
204. But see Pearce, supra note 59, at
205. Mitchell, supra note 199, at 471-72.
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personality of the corporation,20 6 a rule recognizing family entity repre-
sentation would have no coherent legal foundation upon which to build.
This lack of foundation in the substantive law would result in a lack of
guidance in identifying or prioritizing conflicting interests articulated by
individual constituents.20 7 Hypothetical 2208 demonstrates the ambiguity
of such representation. What weight should the lawyer afford Husband's
articulated interest in remaining at home, Wife's interests in preserving
her own health, or A's and B's interests in preserving their parents' estate
to enhance their inheritance? Is the lawyer free to identify and serve
interests that are not articulated by the family members, for example the
interests of enhanced marital unity which might be more fully realized if
Husband and Wife remain in daily contact through Husband's continued
care at home?
It is the personal effect that any resolution of Hypothetical 2 has upon
each individual that makes advising the family as an entity so difficult.
Similarly Professor Mitchell notes that the impact that the corporate de-
cisions will have upon the personal interests of the shareholders renders
entity representation of close corporations unrealistic:
Because counsel's conduct will thus directly affect each of these share-
holders, it should be recognized that counsel owes duty to each of
them. The behavior of these shareholders toward one another will be
regulated by their fiduciary duties, a legal concept which clients can
evaluate only upon advice from counsel. Since each shareholder will
seek to maximize his own welfare, sole counsel to a close corporation
and its shareholders will always, to a greater or less extent, be compro-
mised in duties of care and loyalty.20 9
Professor Mitchell's analysis overtly relies upon a concept of undiluted
self-interest. Temper that with recognition that in many family matters
individuals often seek to promote the interests of others,210 and family
entity representation presents questions even more complex than those
encountered in representation of close corporations. This complexity
cautions against acceptance of the model.
Consider the situation of the lawyer in Hypothetical 1 where Child re-
206. See Wolfram, supra note 29, § 13.7.2 ("It [the corporation-as-entity concept] is
primarily a product of the legal imagination and carries forward the general legal fiction
of the corporation as a separate person.").
207. While identifying and prioritizing interests in a family corporation may be diffi-
cult, the lawyer can be guided by a general corporate purpose-to maximize economic
return to the shareholders. The claims of each shareholder can be roughly measured by
the economic contribution each makes. There are no such rough measures when repre-
senting the family as an entity.
208. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
209. Mitchell, supra note 208, at 472-73 (footnotes omitted)
210. See generally Thomas L. Shaffer, Death, Property, and Lawyers 80-86 (1970) (dis-
cussing survey revealing that estate planning clients are concerned about inability to care
for dependents and causing grief to relatives and friends); Lawrence A. Frolik & Alison
P. Barnes, An Aging Population: A Challenge to the Law, 42 Hastings L.J. 683, 700-02
(1991) (discussing family support systems for the elderly).
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quests information about transferring decision-making authority from
Father.2" Child openly tells Lawyer that part of the concern about Fa-
ther's mental capacity arises from Father's obstruction of Child's goals
for the corporation. To what degree should Lawyer consider the effects
of Father's conduct upon the corporation in advising the family entity?
To whom is that advice given? Child? Father? Mother?
In advising the corporation, Lawyer need not give significant consider-
ation to Child's mixed motives in questioning Father's competence be-
cause that issue is only relevant to the corporation to the extent that
Father's competency must exist in order for any corporate acts he takes
to be effective. While Father, as majority shareholder, still wields signifi-
cant power in the corporation potentially, it does not appear that he has
been active in the day-to-day management since Lawyer's last contact
two years ago. Thus Lawyer's duty to the corporation is much easier to
discern, at least when viewed independently of Lawyer's representation
of Father, Mother, and Child.
Family entity representation should not be rejected merely because its
application is difficult or complex, if the model proves sound other-
wise.2 12 But complex application is not the major flaw in family entity
representation.
The most serious objection to the family entity model of representation
is related to, but distinct from, the objections arising from failure to rec-
ognize the fluidity in the processes of healthy family decision making; its
lack of foundation in substantive law; and its complexity in application.
The most serious objection is that the family entity model allows the
lawyer to disregard the expressed objectives of individual family mem-
bers, and substitute objectives created from the lawyer's perception of the
best interest of the family. Nowhere else are lawyers permitted such
broad-ranging discretion in defining the objectives of representation.
Even organizational counsel are permitted to disregard the directions of
constituents only when those constituents propose to engage in conduct
that violates the constituents' legal obligations to the entity or the
community.21 3
The legitimacy of this objection is evidenced by the attorney's conduct
in Florida Bar v. Betts:214
[R]espondent was retained to prepare the will of his client, Claude
211. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
212. See Shaffer, supra note 3, at 984. Shaffer states:
It is also possible that what is uncomfortable, in the family perspective on cases
like The Case of the Unwanted Will, is the realization that the issues we identify
as we discuss the morals of lawyers are sticky and uncertain. It is much easier
for a lawyer to behave as if he were a clerk in a driver's-license office than to
behave as someone who invites trust from families and then charges by the hour
for accepting it.
Id.
213. See Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.13(b).
214. 530 So.2d 928 (Fla. 1988).
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Fairfield. Subsequently, two codicils were prepared during a time
when Fairfield was in a rapidly deteriorating physical and mental state.
In the first codicil, Fairfield removed his daughter and son-in-law as
beneficiaries. Respondent spoke with his client on several occasions in
an effort to persuade him to reinstate his daughter.
Subsequently, respondent prepared the second codicil to reach this
result. However, when the codicil was presented to Fairfield, he was in
a comatose state. In his findings, the referee determined that the sec-
ond codicil was not read to Fairfield, that Fairfield made no verbal
response when respondent presented the codicil to him, and that the
codicil was executed by an X that respondent marked on the document
with a pen he placed and guided in Fairfield's hand.215
In publicly reprimanding the attorney the Florida Supreme Court ob-
served, "It is undisputed that respondent did not benefit by his action
and was merely acting out of his belief that the client's family should not
be disinherited. Nevertheless, a lawyer's responsibility is to execute his
client's wishes, not his own." 216
How would this case have been decided if Florida recognized family
entity representation and the testator had agreed at the beginning of the
representation that the attorney should act in the family's best interest?
While it seems unlikely that such a general grant of authority would ex-
tend to executing a codicil on the client's behalf, the court seems sympa-
thetic to the argument that the lawyer was well-intentioned and did not
personally profit from the act. This sympathy is evidenced not only by
the language quoted above but also by the fact that the lawyer received
only a public reprimand for what is clearly a fraudulent act.
Ultimately the court recognized that the client must define the objec-
tives of the representation, and the attorney must be bound by them.2' 7
Any other conclusion would threaten to convert representation into
domination.
Unfortunately, if family entity representation were permissible, such
domination would not always take so crude a form as guiding a comatose
client's hand in the execution of a codicil. Instead it could take a far
more subtle form. For example, consider the attorney's conduct in the
following hypothetical fact pattern based upon the common practice of
encouraging the use of prenuptial agreements to protect family assets in
the event a marriage fails:
Parents began a retail business in the early 1970s. It was a tremendous
success, and by 1988, the business was worth $15 million. In 1990,
Child joined the company as an entry-level manager. Unlike other
managers, part of Child's compensation was stock in the company.
215. Id. at 928-29.
216. Id. at 929.
217. Cf Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.2 (allocating to clients the decisions con-
cerning the objectives of representation, while permitting lawyers to decide on tactics).
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Recently, Child announced an intention to marry. Parents were de-
lighted, and like Child's prospective spouse very much.
At a meeting with Lawyer, Child's engagement was mentioned merely
in passing. There was no request of any analysis of the legal implica-
tions of Child's marriage. Lawyer inquired whether Child had dis-
cussed the need for a prenuptial agreement with the prospective
spouse. Child and Parents expressed their disapproval of such agree-
ments. They believed that prenuptial agreements evidenced less than a
complete commitment to a life-long marriage, and often were used to
evade a fair division of a couple's property in the event the marriage
ended in divorce.
Lawyer was astonished by what he or she perceived to be the family's
naivete, and set about to persuade them that a prenuptial agreement
was a necessary precondition to Child's marriage. As part of Lawyer's
efforts to persuade, vivid word pictures of bitter divorces were painted.
References to the "ease" and "certainty" of divorce were ongoing. 218
The prospect of Child's premature death was developed in such detail
that Parents eventually demanded that Lawyer not speak of it again.
Ultimately Lawyer's efforts to "protect the family's best interest" pre-
vailed, and Child reluctantly presented the proposed prenuptial agree-
ment to prospective spouse. The terms of the agreement were very
aggressive waiving all spousal statutory rights arising due to death or
divorce. It was signed by both Child and prospective spouse, but
neither Child nor Parents were pleased with the intrusion of legalistic
protectionism into what they considered a sacred life-long union.
Should this result be applauded? Clearly Lawyer maximized the pro-
tection of the family's economic and legal interests. But the family had
other interests that it believed to be more important-unity, faithfulness,
and commitment. By elevating legal and economic interests over the re-
lational aspects of the union, the lawyer has denied the family's under-
standing of its best interest, and imposed the lawyer's counterfeit.
Domination, whether by the lawyer or an individual family member, is
more likely to occur in family entity representation, not only because the
lawyer ultimately defines what is in the family's best interest, but also
because the lawyer exercises limited control over family members' access
to information. This is true because the entity's lawyer is under no obli-
gation to disclose all relevant information to all constituents of the entity.
Rather the lawyer has a duty to promote the best interests of the entity
through selective disclosure of information, often upon the basis of which
constituents need to know. 219
Skarbrevik v. Cohen England & Whitfield220 illustrates the harsh p0-
218. The inaccuracy of this characterization of divorce is evidenced by the fact that in
1989 two-thirds of Americans were married to their first spouse, and "a little more than
four-fifths of those who are married have or have had only one spouse-the difference
being those who have divorced and not remarried." Andrew M. Greely, Faithful Attrac-
tion 35 (1991).
219. See 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 21, § 1.13.107.
220. 231 Cal. App. 3d 692 (Ct. App. 1991).
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tential of permitting selective disclosure. Plaintiff was one of four share-
holders who equally owned all stock in an insurance brokerage company.
During 1983, he became dissatisfied and requested the other shareholders
to buy his stock from him. After some negotiations an agreement was
reached to do so, and plaintiff resigned his position as director and officer
of the corporation.22" ' After the plaintiff resigned, however, the other
shareholders decided not to repurchase his stock. Instead they asked
corporate counsel to advise them on how to go about diluting plaintiff's
interest without having to compensate him. Eventually a plan was de-
vised and actions taken that effectively reduced plaintiff's percentage
ownership from twenty-five per cent to less than five per cent. The cor-
porate lawyer facilitated these acts either through ignorance of certain
restrictions in the corporation's governing documents or through
complicity. 222
Upon discovering his loss, the plaintiff sued the corporation, the other
shareholders, the lawyer and the law firm representing the corporation.
His claims were based upon conspiracy to defraud and professional negli-
gence. All defendants other than the lawyer and the law firm settled
prior to trial. After hearing the case the jury awarded the plaintiff ap-
proximately $1 million in damages. On appeal, the California Court of
Appeal reversed, finding the attorney's duty ran strictly to the corpora-
tion. Thus no award premised upon professional negligence could stand.
Also, while the court did not condone the lawyer's conduct in facilitating
the fraud practiced upon the plaintiff, in the absence of a personal attor-
ney-client relationship, the lawyer had no independent duty to disclose
the wrongful conduct to the plaintiff.223 Therefore, the appellate court
reversed the judgment of the trial court.
Imagine a comparable scenario in the context of family entity repre-
sentation. The family determines that it is in the family's best interest
that Elderly Parent's assets be transferred to the children in order to
facilitate eligibility for Medicaid assistance when he or she might seek
admission to a nursing home. With the knowledge, if not active partici-
pation, of the family lawyer they begin surreptitiously transferring funds
to other family accounts. Prior to Parent's discovery of the misconduct,
the money is spent for family purposes (e.g. grandchildren's college edu-
cations), although none of it directly benefits Parent. Upon discovery,
Parent sues the family entity, individual family members, and the family
lawyer, only to learn that the court will dismiss the lawyer as a defendant
because the lawyer had no duty running to Parent as an individual.224
221. See id. at 710.
222. See id. at 631.
223. See id. at 639.
224. Professors Hazard and Hodes suggest that, even adhering to the entity model, the
lawyer could disclose to other stake-holders while the lawyer acts for the entity. See 1
Hazard & Hodes, supra note 21, § 1.13.403. However, as their citation to case authority
suggests, the most common route for the courts to take in authorizing disclosure is to find
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Such a result would be impossible under the individual, joint, or interme-
diary models of representation where the lawyer remains accountable to
each person he accepts as a client. 225
In addition to claims that the family entity model is beneficial because
the family is represented by an attorney committed to the best interests
of the family, rather than the individuals, and the attorney is authorized
to disclose or reveal information provided by family members judiciously
in order to benefit the family entity, proponents claim that family entity
representation is desirable because it will allow continuous representation
of the family entity, regardless of the disagreement or departure of any
individual constituent (family member, in this instance). This power of
continued representation is much broader than that afforded under any
other model of representation, and it reflects the dominating influence of
the corporate entity in the drafting of Rule 1.13.
Publicly held corporations differ from other business forms largely due
to four characteristics: (1) limited liability for investors; (2) free transfer-
ability of investor interests; (3) legal personality; and (4) centralized man-
agement.226 The second characteristic explains the breadth of the
continuous representation aspect of Rule 1.13. Corporate lawyers simply
cannot be held to have maintained an attorney-client relationship with
every shareholder or member of upper management in a corporation.
The mutability of the clients' identity is too immense. Nor does this rule
generally result in acts of disloyalty or breaches of personal confidences
when such a change in identity occurs in publicly held corporations.
Close corporations, on the other hand, do not have this fluidity of
ownership and management. Courts have recognized this fact and have
therefore treated close corporations accordingly-as partnerships for in-
ternal disputes, and corporations for disputes with others.
Family relationships, as traditionally defined, " 7 are even more perma-
nent. Even if the prodigal son never returns, a blood bond will be created
with the next generation. Individuals can not easily divest themselves of
their interests in this spouse and replace them with interests in another.
In short, family members are not fungible. Each occupies a unique and
permanent place in the family. While any individual family member can
terminate any attorney-client relationship with the "family lawyer," rela-
tionships with the family are not so easily destroyed. Continued repre-
that the lawyer for the close corporation or partnership represents the individual princi-
pals as well. See Responsible Citizens v. Askins, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756 (Ct. App. 1993).
225. See Baldasarre v. Butler, 625 A.2d 458, 464 (N.J. 1993) (rejecting attorney's de-
fense to malpractice claim based upon the existence of conflicting duties and stating that
"[i]t is the attorney's responsibility to avoid conflicts of interest, and if the attorney fails
to do so, it is the attorney and not an innocent client who will be liable for any injured
client").
226. See Clark, supra note 155, at 2.
227. The most traditional definition of family is related by blood, marriage or adop.
tion. A similar definition was upheld in Village of Belle Terre Y. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 94
(1974) when used in a New York village land use ordinance.
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sentation of multiple family members as the "family entity" after others
have terminated the attorney-client relationship is undesirable. It gives
the lawyer and only a few members of the family the right to define fam-
ily interests in a manner more exclusive than blood ties and lifetime com-
mitments would permit. This is wrong.
Proponents of family entity representation are motivated by an under-
standing of family that is profoundly different from the contemporary
legal understanding. This understanding defies attempts to reduce the
fullness of family relationships to some legalistic formula of rights and
duties. Rather, family is recognized as the lived experience of a small
community of people who are inextricably bound by blood ties, deep
emotional bonds, and common experience. This understanding is true.
It is not the basis for the ultimate failure of the model of family entity
representation.
Family entity representation fails because it elevates the lawyer to the
status of a family member. Yet the attorney-client relationship is not the
product of blood ties, deep emotions, or common experience. It is the
product of a voluntary association between the client who needs help and
the lawyer who has the skill to help.228 Empowering lawyers to deter-
mine the best interest of the family denies the inherent limitations on
lawyers' understanding of the families they serve. These limitations are
unavoidable because the lawyer does not share the family's blood rela-
tionship, emotional ties, or common experience. Discretionary withhold-
ing of information by the lawyer disables family members in their
attempts to relate to each other and make sound decisions that affect the
family. Continuous representation of the family after the termination of
representation of individual family members denies clients the right to
choose their own counsel, and it is dishonest to the extent that the lawyer
purports to represent the family, when in fact only one part of the family
remains as the client.
Intermediation and joint representation are currently available to fami-
lies seeking mutual legal assistance. Permitting the family to be repre-
sented as an entity adds few benefits and poses substantial dangers.
CONCLUSION
Representation of families is both rewarding and frustrating. It is re-
warding because attorneys often see a generosity and caring in and for
their clients that is rarely evidenced in other types of representation. It is
frustrating because family relationships necessarily involve individuals
who have different desires, needs, and expectations. The current models
of legal representation recognize both the individual and communal as-
pects of families. Through individual representation, the lawyer offers
clients a refuge from the pressures that other family members exert and
228. See Monroe H. Freedman, Legal Ethics and the Suffering Clients, 36 Cath. U.L.
Rev. 311, 331 (1987).
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the opportunity to be represented by someone who has no higher duty
than to serve the individual client. As an intermediary, the lawyer and
clients acknowledge the conflicting individual desires that arise in fami-
lies, but commit from the outset to create harmony from their discord
and strength from their differences. In joint representation, clients may
present a united front to those outside the family, whether friend or foe.
In each of these models every individual gives assent to the purposes of
representation and commands equal loyalty from the lawyer. Only in
family entity representation is the individual subsumed by the family and
therein lies its dangerous appeal. Yet the best interests of the family can-
not be served by denial of the individuality of each member. Entity rep-
resentation, by its very nature, demands this denial, and therefore can
never safely accomplish that which is not already possible wvithin the
three existing models.

